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I. Introduction
The Church-State relation in the United States today encompasses a
wide variety of legal and social problems. Determining the place of
religion and its attendant spiritual values in a pluralistic society is a per-
plexing problem requiring a broad basis of thought and analysis. This
Note is an attempt to examine critically and exhaustively the judicial
recognition of this relation over the past three years.
With the appearance of this Note, the Notre Dame Lawyer is inau-
gurating a new feature which will be perpetuated on a biennial basis.
Every two years the Lawyer will present an analysis such as is found
here, bringing its readers up to date on new developments in the field of
Church-State. As this tradition gradually develops, it is expected that
the form and content of these studies will become more crystallized,
providing a better and more thorough presentation of the problem.
Some areas of the problem have been purposely excluded from the
present study because of their marginal connection with the central issue.
Chief among these perhaps is the area of intra-church disputes, involving
such matters as conflicting claims to church property or disagreement as
to the official ruling authority of a church. The issues presented by these
problems require treatment of a different sort than that found here.
It is hoped that the originality of this study lies in presenting at one
glance the over-all topography of the Church-State issue. The approach
here is not confined solely to the institutional balance struck in the first
amendment with its subsequent judicial interpretations. To restrict the
problem in this manner is to ignore the broader social and political con-
texts of the problem. Although recent case law and legislation serve as
the springboard of the analysis, it has become necessary to look beyond
these official agencies of government to discern the general contours of
the problem. Because many of the crucial dimensions of the relationship
have not appeared before the courts and probably never will, the writers
have taken into account the important discussion taking place in the
larger form of public opinion and criticism.
The first part of the Note, Religious Institutions, deals with the issues
traditionally considered within the idea of Church-State. It is here that
the direct conflicts arise between Church and State considered as juridical
entities, each seekjng to justify its rights against the asserted authority
of the other. Section Two considers the broader problem of religious
values seeking vindication before the legal tribunals of our country. The
chief emphasis here is not upon a church considered as a juridical entity,
but upon the person as a moral agent, acting simultaneously as a mem-
ber of the political community and a religious society. With Church
and State exercising concurrent jurisdiction with respect to these values,
it is the position of the person as a member of both institutions that
becomes of primary importance. Employing these two lines of analysis,
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it is hoped that the widest possible perspective on the question of Church
and State can be achieved.
II. RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS
A. ZONING-A Favorable Treatment
Churches and religious institutions have fared well under zoning laws
during the past three years. The cases exhibit little appreciable change
from previous decisions in this area. That churches and sectarian schools
cannot be excluded from residentially zoned districts is firmly established
in the majority of jurisdictions.' In some instances the legislatures have
interceded, declaring invalid ordinances or by-laws which prohibit or
limit the use of land for church purposes.2 Broad policy considerations
have been enunciated in this field, with courts reasoning that even
though churches in residential areas may increase traffic hazards or
decrease property value, the high purposes and moral values of these
institutions outweigh any such drawbacks. 3 The same policy considera-
tions have also prevailed in the successful efforts of denominational
schools to locate in residential areas.4
In an important case before the California Supreme Court, an ordi-
nance was declared unconstitutional that excluded private schools
from a district covering 98.7% of the city.5 Petitioner sought to build
a Roman Catholic elementary school within this area, and was denied
a permit. The court said a private institution cannot be arbitrarily exclud-
ed, while public schools are allowed in the same district. Parents have
the right to send their children to private rather than to public schools,
and to have such schools located in the immediate vicinity or general
neighborhood. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reached a contrary result
previously, holding that private high schools may be excluded from
certain districts, since they discriminate in their admission policies and
thus do not serve the general welfare to the same extent as does a public
school.6 The Supreme Court dismissed this case for want of a substantial
federal question. 7
1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 222, 247 (2d ed. 1953).
2 MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 40A, § 2 (Sup. 1956).
3 Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd,, 1 N.Y.2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 827 (1956);
Application of Gardan City Jewish Center, 2 Misc. 1009, 155 N.Y.S.2d 523 (Sup.
Ct. 1956). Contra, West Hartford Methodist Church v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 143
Conn. 263, 121 A.2d 640 (1956).
4 In re O'Hara's Appeal, 389 Pa. 35, 131 A.2d 587 (1957). But see Ranney
v. Istituto Pontificio Delle Maestre Filippini, 20 N.J. 189, 119 A.2d 142 (1955).
5 Roman Catholic Welfare Corp. v. City of Piedmont, 45 Cal. 2d 325, 289
P.2d 438 (1955). The court did not specify in what respect the ordinance was
unconstitutional, saying only it was an arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination
against private schools.
6 State ex rel. Wisconsin Lutheran High School Conference v. Sinar, 267
Wis. 91, 65 N.W.2d 43 (1954). See Brindel, Zoning Out Religious Institutions, 32
No=E DAemE LAW. 627 (1957).
7 349 U.S. 913 (1955). See Seitz, Constitutional and General Welfare Con-
siderations in Efforts to Zone Out Private Schools, 11 MiAmI L. Q. 68 (1956).
The writer criticises the Court for overlooking what he considers to be a very
substantial federal question under the due process and equal protection clauses
of the fourteenth amendment.
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As with all zoning ordinances, the justification for those that affect
religious institutions is that they are a valid exercise of the. police power,
bearing a reasonable relation to public morals, health, safety, and
general welfare. But courts demand that these justifications be rigorously
substantiated in the case of churches, less the paradoxical situation arise
that they are being excluded on the basis of public morals or welfare, the
very things churches themselves are attempting to promote.8 But occa-
sionally the courts have treated the application of a church in the same
manner as any other institution, granting the ordinance the traditional
presumption of validity, and requiring strong reasons for its overthrow.9
Certain decisions have properly excluded or limited churches, where it
is clear that the benefit to the church would be slight in relation to the
overriding social utility of enforcing the ordinance.' 0
Successful objections to zoning ordinances have been made on the
grounds of due process, equal protection of the laws, and the free exer-
cise of religion;" or on the grounds that the ordinance, though consti-
tutional in itself, has been applied unreasonably, amounting to an abuse
of discretion on the part of the zoning board.12 Rigid enforcement of
ordinances has been refused where the church was able to show it would
be subjected to unreasonable hardship, or would be placed in a position
of great disadvantage in carrying on its work.13 All these pleas have
met with sympathy in the great majority of courts, and there is every
reason to believe that this view will persist, with the courts displaying
even more leniency in this area. Behind this attitude appears to be the
unspoken commitment that churches should be given every opportunity
to prosper, even at the expense of some possible hardship to other in-
terests. Churches play too important a role in fostering desirable social
and moral values to be zoned out of existence or to be relegated to in-
dustrial or commercial districts. Courts have displayed this favorable
disposition toward churches in situations both where the ordinance
makes a provision for their location, but restricts them to certain dis-
tricts1 4 and where the ordinance requires that certain conditions be met
before a building permit will be granted. 15
The issue of what constitutes a use accessory to the church and its
property has been considered in a few cases, dealing chiefly with appli-
cations for parking lots. Generally, ordinances are framed so as to allow
all uses reasonably accessory to the premises. What constitutes such a
use must be determined on the particular facts of each case. One court
has held that a parking lot is a use accessory to the church premises,
8 Congregation Comm., Jehovah's Witnesses v. City Council, 287 S.W.2d
700 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
9 Miami Beach United Lutheran Church v. Miami Beach, 82 So. 2d 880
(Fla. 1955).
10 Cf. Congregation Beth Israel v. Board of Estimate, 285 App. Div. 629,
139 N.Y.S.2d 645 (1st Dep't 1955).
11 For an extended discussion of this aspect of the zoning question, see 70
HARv. L. REv. 1428 (1957).
12 Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., I N.Y.2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 827 (1956).
13 Stevenson v. Board of Adjustment, 96 S.E.2d 456 (S.C. 1957); cf. State
ex rel. Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Wenatchee, 312 P.2d 195 (Wash. 1957).
14 Young Israel Organization v. Dworkin, 133 N.E.2d 174 (Ohio App. 1956).
15 Community Synagogue v. Bates, 1 N.Y.2d 445, 136 N.E.2d 488 (1956).
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since it relieves traffic congestion and aids the church in carrying out
its work.16 But if the church may be built in another district, with no
great hardship involved, then the variance for a parking lot will not
be granted, especially where there are additional factors such as high-
way safety or undue traffic congestion. 17
In short, churches and church-related institutions have had smooth
sailing in this field. And if prediction is warranted by the precedents, the
conclusion seems inescapable that their petitions for building permits,
variances, exceptions, and the like, will continue to be greeted favorably.
This is an area of Church-State relations where moral and religious
issues are not present, where constitutional scruples about separation do
not lurk forebodingly In the background. And for this reason, it will
probably never bear the marks of bitter disagreement and dispute charac-
teristic of other aspects of Church-State relations.
B. SCHOOLs-The Wall of Separation Re-examined
On the general question of religion in publicly supported schools, no
cases of any great import have appeared in the past three years. The
United States Supreme Court has not spoken on the question since 1952
when it decided the landmark case of Zorach v. Clauson.'8 A 1953 New
Jersey decision 19 declared unconstitutional the practice by the Gideons
Society of distributing the King James version of the Bible to school
children whose parents so requested. On petition for certiorari, the Su-
preme Court declined to hear the case.20 Many issues in this area remain
unresolved, and will no doubt continue to be so for some time to come.2 '
The Kentucky Court of Appeals in 1956 held that the practice of con-
ducting public school classes in Roman Catholic school buildings, with
nuns as teachers, was constitutionally permissible. 22 The arrangement
was an economy measure by the local school board, stemming from a
lack of facilities and teachers. The nuns wore the religious garb of their
order, and upon this fact rested the main protest which brought the
case to the highest court of the state. The objecting party claimed that
the practice of nuns wearing their religious garb was a violation of the
first and fourteenth amendment guarantees of freedom of religion. In
holding the practice constitutional, the court pointed out that if these
nuns were denied the right to teach in a state supported school because
of their religious beliefs, they would be denied equal protection of the
laws. The decision is squarely in opposition to a statute passed by North
Dakota in 1948, providing that no person while teaching in the public
schools of the state shall wear any dress or garb indicating that the
person is a member of any religious denomination. 23
16 Mahrt v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, 142 N.E.2d 567 (Ohio C.P.
1955), al'd, 142 N.E.2d 678 (Ohio App. 1956).
17 Appeal of Jehovah's Witnesses, 183 Pa. Super. 219, 130 A.2d 240 (1957).
18 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
19 Tudor v. Board of Education, 14 N.J. 31, 100 A.2d 857 (1953).
20 Sub nom. Gideons Int'd. v. Tudor, 348 U.S. 816 (1954).
21 During its 167 years of existence, the Supreme Court has listened to only
ten cases on the question of religion in public schools. See Sutherland, Public
Authority and Religious Education, 52 RELIGIOUS EDUCATION 256, 260 (1957).
22 Rawlings v. Butler, 290 S.W.2d 801 (Ky. 1956).
23 N.D. REv. CODE C. 15-47, § 15--4729 (Supp. 1953).
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Within six weeks, however, the Kentucky Court of Appeals decided
the case of Wooley v. Spalding.2 4 Here the court was presented with the
problem of two public schools being staffed largely by Roman Catholic
nuns, with the following additional facts: the school libraries featured
virtually nothing but Catholic periodicals, sectarian religious training
was conducted during time set aside by statute for "moral instruction";
and the schools were closed on all Roman Catholic holydays. This last
fact prevented Protestant children from attending yet another school
on these days because the school buses did no run. The court directed
that an injunction be granted against keeping sectarian periodicals in the
libraries and suspending school bus operations on holydays. This is a
sound decision, as the excesses found were unreasonable and apparently
unnecessary.
While the Kentucky Court of Appeals appears to have struck a rga-
sonable and operative position on the question of religion in public
schools, judicial thinking in other states continues to manifest the
extremism of Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education.2 5 The now
unfortunate and twisted phrase of Jefferson's that the American people,
by adopting the first amendment, wished to build "a wall of separation
between Church and State" has given rise to numerous artificial distinc-
tions and limitations, most sharply illustrated by the Supreme Court's
McCollum decision.26 The most recent manifestations of this type of
thinking have come out of New York and New Jersey. 27 The New York
Commissioner of Education has declared that the Ten Commandments
may not be displayed in public school rooms. The reasoning seems to
be that since they cannot be commented upon by the teacher, their
unexplained presence in the schoolroom will cause needless disharmony
and conflict among the students. In New Jersey, an Attorney General's
opinion has banned the public recitation of grace before meals in public
schools as a violation of freedom of religion.
These views represent an over-cautious mentality on the problem of
Church-State, resulting in the paradoxical situation that free and legitimate
expressions of religion are snuffed out under the guise of protecting
constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion. The intent of such
measures is to give the maximum protection to rights guaranteed by the
first amendment; and yet, oddly enough, their effect is to limit and even
suffocate these very rights. Current discussion of the matter seems to
focus almost exclusively upon the establishment clause of the first
amendment. What, indeed, has become of the second clause? - "Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof." The implications of this clause
deserve closer scrutiny and analysis.
24 293 S.W.2d 563 (Ky. 1956).
•5 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
26 Not to mention the Court's dictum in Everson v. Board of Education, 330
U.S. 1, 15 (1947): "The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
Church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another."
27 See 60 Nation's Schools 45 (Dec. 1957).
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A position at once more realistic and consistent with the intent of
constitutional safeguards is found in the case of Carden v. Bland.28 The
Supreme Court of Tennessee held that the reading without comment of
passages from the Bible in public schools does not violate freedom of
religion. Speaking of the doctrine of separation of Church and State, the
court said:
[I]t sould not be tortured into a meaning that was never intended by the
Founders of this Republic, with the result that the public school system
of the several states is to be made a Godless institution as a matter of
law.2 9
A similar attitude is reflected in the decision of a New York court hold-
ing that there is no violation of first amendment rights when the phrase
"under God" is included in the recitation of the pledge of allegiance to
the flag.30 These two decisions, along with others in the same spirit, repre-
sent a sound and balanced perspective of the problem of religion in public
schools. They avoid the excesses found in the thinking of those who by
guarding religious freedom too vigilantly, strangle legitimate expressions
of religious duty and devotion. It would seem that the struggle will
continue between those who read the establishment clause of the first
amendment as demanding an absolute wall of separation and non-recog-
nition and those who read it more flexibly as allowing impartial non-
preferential assistance toward all sectarian groups.3 '
Although the present state of the law seems to impede any religious
manifestations in the public schools, the de facto conditions existing
locally throughout the country may well be in the opposite direction.
While court decisions and official rulings reflect a certain climate of
opinion, a wide latitude with respect to them can be found in concrete
plans and programs across the nation. Professor Sutherland has made
the following interesting observation on this point:
The practical impossibility of consistent and doctrinaire constitutional
literalism in matters of Church and State throughout our federal nation
maybe one of the curious benefits of the system. It seems to be one of those
benign paradoxes which permit an adjustment of localism to national
policy, and so make life reasonably tolerable in our widespread and diverse
nation.32
In short, a good deal of the Church-State dispute is perhaps being
thrashed out at the level of abstract comment and discussion, not at the
level of local schools boards and classrooms.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in a five-one decision refused to take
up the precise question of whether, in the absence of statutory authoriza-
tion, a county school board has discretionary power to transport parochial
school children in its buses. 33 While disposing of the case on technical
grounds, the court hinted that they would find this practice unconstitu-
28 199 Tenn. 665, 288 S.W.2d 718 (1956).
29 Id. at 724; accord, Commonwealth v. Renfrew, 332 Mass. 492, 126 N.E.2d
109 (1955).
30 Lewis v. Allen, 5 Misc.2d 68, 159 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
31 For a stimulating presentation of these two positions, see Pfeffer & O'Neill,
The Meaning of the Establishment Clause, 2 BUFFALO L. REv. 225 (1953); see also
Drinker, Some Observations on the Four Freedoms of the First Amendment, 37
B. U. L. Rev. 1, 49-69 (1957).
32 Sutherland, supra note 21, at 264.
33 School Dist. v. Houghton, 387 Pa. 236, 128 A.2d 58 (1956).
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tional if they were someday to decide the question on its merits. The
strong rhetorical dissent protested that the constitutional question should
have been determined; and further, that it should have been decided in
favor of allowing parochial school children the use of the school district's
transportation facilities, since it would not increase the cost to taxpayers
and cause a deflection of public funds for sectarian purposes.
Non-legal skirmishes continue to take place occasionally as to whether
federal funds should be made available to privately owned sectarian
schools. Little new has been said on this question, as it seems resolved in
the direction of denying such funds. However, it has been recently advo-
cated by the Catholic Jesuit Education Association that in light of the
pressing needs for increased technical and scientific education, and the
Administration's consequent plan for a four-year, billion dollar outlay,
the sectarian schools should be included under this subsidy. Otherwise,
as the Association pointed out, ". . . the program could not achieve
its purpose, because it would by-pass a very large pool of individual
talent and educational facilities."'3 4 The suggestion bears attention and
discussion, and it cannot be summarily written off as parochial grasping.
Perhaps the time is not ripe for such aid. Jurists and political theorists
may think the issue fs dead, the question foreclosed. But with constant
expansion of sectarian educational institutions, and their role in the
American schooling picture, the prediction seems safe that the question
has not yet seen its final resolution.35
C. TAXATIN-Unresolved Issues
The broad area of property tax exemptions for religious institutions
is governed wholly by statute. Various state statutes, while roughly
similar in their over-all contours, exhibit a sufficient amount of difference
to result in a multi-sided body of case law on the problem. A substantial
number of important cases have come before the courts since 1955.
In a most significant decision, the Supreme Court of California held
constitutional a statute requiring a church to sign a non-subversive
declaration as a condition for tax exemption. 38 The church had refused
to sign the oath, but still demanded its exemption. The court restated the
traditional view that an exemption is a privilege granted by the sover-
eign, and can be withdrawn if stipulated conditions are not met. The
United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari.a
7
Another issue of basic importance was before the same court in the
case of Lundberg v. County of Alameda38 where a local taxpayer chal-
34 Chicago Sun-Times, Jan. 5, 1958, p. 7, col. 1. As could be expected, the
Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State lodged
an immediate protest.
35 For a general discussion of the problem, pointing out that private and
church-related schools exist by right and not by sufferance, see the American
Bishops' Annual Statement, 1955, The Place of Private and Church-Related Schools
in American Education, in 56 CATHOLiC SCHOOL JostrNAL 1 (1956).
36 First Unitarian Church v. County of Los Angeles, 48 Cal. 2d 419, 311
P.2d 508 (1957). Companion cases, decided on the same day, were: People's
Church v. County of Los Angeles, 48 Cal. 2d 899, 311 P.2d 540 (1957); First
Methodist Church v. Horstmann, 48 Cal. 2d 901, 311 P.2d 542 (1957).
37 355 U.S. 853 (1957).
38 46 Cal. 2d 644, 298 P.2d 1 (1956).
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lenged the legality of a statute exempting property used for schools of
less than collegiate level, owned and operated by religious and charitable
organizations. The taxpayer protested that this amounted to subsidising
the schools, thus contravening the establishment clause of the first
amendment. A sharply divided court held against the taxpayer, pointing
out that the measure was in the interests of public welfare, and even
though the schools were benefiting by this, there was no violation of the
flirst amendment. 39 The majority also pointed to its general policy of
construing exemption statutes broadly in favor of the institution seeking
to come within the privilege.4 0 Upon appeal to the United States Supreme
Court, the case was dismissed per curiam for want of a substantial
federal question.4 1 The fact that the exemption was sustained by a
narrow four-three margin indicates that courts are perhaps probing the
whole rational of property tax exemptions for religious institutions and re-
examining the foundations of the doctrine. And while the Supreme
Court's dismissal has probably laid the issue to rest for the present, its
future is not certain.4 2
The traditional reason for granting property tax exemptions to charit-
able, educational, and religious institutions is that they are performing a
service for the state by fulfilling certain needs. In return for this service,
as a quid pro quo, the state excuses the institution from paying taxes.
Some courts enforce this requirement rigidly by refusing to uphold the
exemption if the citizens of the state do not benefit from the institu-
tion.43 Other courts have said this reciprocity is not necessary if the
service results in the "encouragement of certain endeavors that the
body politic considers beneficial or desirable. ' ' 44 It is difficult to say at
present whether the reciprocity requirement will continue as one of the
strong currents in the law of tax exemptions.
The bulk of the cases in this area consider the problem of determining
whether a given institution is charitable or religious. This issue frequent-
ly arises when the institution in question maintains marginal interests,
39 Cf. Schade v. Allegheny County Institution Dist. 386 Pa. 507, 126 A.2d
911 (1956).
40 But see City of Ashland v. Calvary Protestant Episcopal Church, 278 S.W.2d
708 (Ky. 1955) (exemption for religious societies construed strictly; exemption
for educational and charitable groups construed broadly).
41 Sub. nom. Heisey v. County of Alameda, 352 U.S. 921 (1957) (Justices
Black and Frankfurter dissented). See 9 STAN. L. REv. 366 (1957), criticising the
Court for refusing to hear the case. The writer of the comment argues with some
persuasion that the effect of the case is to permit subsidies to sectarian schools,
thus violating the first amendment. The writer's dubious propositions appear to
befog the basic issue in the case, however. The conclusions reached thus tend to be
rhetorical and over-stated.
42 Efforts are being made to repeal the California exemption statute through
an initiative petition which will be submitted to the voters in November. This is
being met with strong objection by political leaders of both parties. See The New
World, Feb. 21, 1958, p. 11, col. 1.
43 Young Life Campaign v. Board of County Commissioners, 134 Colo. 15,
300 P.2d 535 (1956).
44 In re Assessment for the Year 1952, 387 Pa. 534, 128 A.2d 773, 779 (1957),
reversing 180 Pa. Super. 216, 119 A.2d 550 (1956) (missionary society owned
property within the state, but worked exclusively among the poor in the West
Indies); cf. City of Asbury Park v. New Jersey, 41 N.J. Super. 504, 125 A.2d 411(1956), certification denied, 22 N.J. 574, 126 A.2d 910 (1956).
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fringing on an economic enterprise, but yet ultimately related to its
religious or charitable purposes. The courts are split on the question
of whether the use of property or its ultimate purpose is the controlling
factor. For example, where a church rented out a downstairs portion of
its building to a retail merchant, collected rent and used the proceeds
for church purposes, the exemption was denied, since it extends to the
religious use of property only.45 And where a church maintained a
book store for profit, the exemption was likewise denied, even though
profits on sales were turned over to the church. 46 The court made it clear
that it is the present use of the property, and not the ultimate disposition
of proceeds therefrom that furnishes the criterion. Where the facts
clearly indicate that the petitioning taxpayer is operating a mercantile
establishment for profit, the exemption will be denied with little hesita-
tion even though a religious organization may be an incidental benefi-
ciary of the enterprise. 47 In such a case, courts will generally use the
test of primary source of income (as distinguished from use of property).
But the Supreme Court of Georgia used the test of primary purpose, and
concluded on this basis that property is exempt if all realized revenue is
turned over to furthering the religious aims of the institution.48
If a religious institution can demonstrate that a particular piece of
property is incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplish-
meit of its purposes, an exemption will be granted. Falling within this
class are parking areas and residences for the convenience of a divinity
school's faculty and students, 49 and a rest home to house foreign mission-
aries temporarily on furlough. 50
In Assessors of Dover v. Dominican Fathers,5 ' the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts was faced with construing a statute exempting
property owned by "literary, benevolent, charitable, and scientific insti-
tutions .... ,"52 The property in question was owned by a religious order
of the Catholic Church, used as a priory and seminary for the training
and education of candidates for the priesthood. The local tax board
contended that the property fell into none of the four categories of
45 City of Ashland v. Calvary Protestant Episcopal Church, 278 S.W.2d 708
(Ky. 1955); St. Louis Gospel Center v. Prose, 280 S.W.2d 827 (Mo. 1955). See
also Township of Teaneck v. Lutheran Bible Institute, 20 N.J. 86, 118 A.2d 809
(1955) (exemption based on use of property, not on the status of the user).
46 Lutheran Book Shop v. Bowers, 164 Ohio St. 359, 131 N.E.2d 219 (1955).
Contra, Solheim Lutheran Home v. County of Los Angeles, .313 P.2d 185 (Cal.
App.2d 1957).
47 Sunday School Bd. of Southern Baptist Convention v. McCue, 179 Kan. 1,
293 P.2d 234 (1956).
48 Church of God of the Union Assembly v. City of Dalton, 213,-Ga.' 76,
97 S.E.2d 132 (1957); ci. In re YMCA of Pittsburgh, 383 Pa. 175, 117 A.2d 743
(1955).
49 Church Divinity School v. County-of Alameda, 314-P.2d 209 (Cal. App.2d
1957). But ci., Township of Teaneck v. Lutheran Bible Institute, 20 N.J. 86, 118
A.2d 809 (1955). .
50 House of Rest v. County of Los Angeles, .313 P.2d 392 (Cal. App.2d 1957);
cf. Congregation B'nai Yisroel v. Township of Milburn, 35. N.J. Super. 67, 113
A.2d 182 (1955) (any use incident to the fair enjoyment of property is entitled
to exemption).
51 334 Mass. 530, 137 N.E.2d 225 (1956).
52 MAss. ANN. LAws c. 59, § 5 (Supp. 1957).
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exemption. The court would not hear this argument, holding instead it
is unnecessary that the exact criteria of a "literary" or "scientific" educa-
tion be met. The decisive matter is that the public benefits from this
institution; and although the public at large may not benefit, at least
"an indefinite class of persons" does, which is sufficient to satisfy the
statute.
Two cases arose during the three year period under survey that were
addressed to the problem of whether a religious society must profess
belief in a Supreme Being to qualify for an exemption. In one, an appel-
late court of California decided it did not, and that a group dedicated
to "studying human relationships from the viewpoint of religion, educa-
tion and sociology" was entitled to the exemption.53 There was evidence
tending to show that he group professed no belief in a Supreme Being,
but the court said that since the concept of religion has been greatly
expanded in our times, a humanistic group would be considered within
the exempt class. A federal appellate court reached the same conclusion,54
reversing a tax court decision that had refused exemption on the grounds
that the petitioning group professed no belief in a Supreme Deity.
These two cases represent a new and interesting approach to the
exemption question, and a discernible movement may be under way in
the direction of allowing exemptions to groups with little or no positive
religious content, within the traditional meaning of the word. The effects
of this approach would seem to be more in the direction of increasing
the number of societies entitled to exemptions, rather than any notice-
able deleterious effects on religion itself. If the scope of exemption is to
be enlarged, the only people who might be adversely affected are county
tax assessors, since more applications for exemptions will be made. The
traditional concept of religion may have been diluted as a result of these
two decisions, but the practical consequences seem to be negligible.
A comparison of these two decisions with the cases mentioned above55
concerning the denial of exemptions to religious societies maintaining
peripheral econmic interests exhibits an incongruous state of affairs. These
latter cases deny the exemption to an otherwise valid religious group
because of some marginal mercantile enterprise, while on the other
hand, groups with no discernible religious form or purpose are granted
the exemption. While this relationship borders on the inconsistent, it is
doubtful any courts will be too concerned with it in the future.
In conclusion, it is clear that courts disagree over specific issues, by
reason of the divergent statutes controlling the matter in the various
jurisdictions. On the issue of whether a church is excused despite its
economic enterprises, the weight of authority is that the exemption is
lost in such a situation, regardless of where the money may ultimately go.
53 Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 315 P.2d 394 (Cal. App.
2d 1957).
54 Washington Ethical Soc'y v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir.
1957). The court avoided the issue of whether the Society was entitled to the
exemption as a religious group: "The question before us now is not broadly
whether petitioner is in an ecclesiastical sense a religious society or a church, but
narrowly whether under this particular statute it is qualified for tax exemption."
249 F.2d at 129.
55 See notes 44-50, supra.
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On the two questions of non-subversive oaths as a condition to exemp-
tion and the necessity of professing belief in a Supreme Being, more can
be expected. Speculation on these two issues is necessarily circumscribed
by the small number of decisions thus far handed down. Suffice to say
that the great bulk of case law on these questions is yet to be developed.
D. TORT LniLrry-Toward Social Responsibility
The freedom from tort liability previously enjoyed by 'religious bodies
is slowly dissolving in the general thaw which has gripped the field of
charitable immunity. It is beyond the scope of the survey to review the
whole immunity problem, but during the period of the survey the courts
have expressed certain ideas on the position of religious institutions in the
development of this area of law worth examining.
In Nevada, a direct attack was made on the immunity doctrine through
arguments which the court admittedly found persuasive.56 But the pro-
tection of religious bodies was not abandoned; the court reasoned that
the change was a task for the legislature. The reason for the reluctance
to change was the reliance which many protected institutions had placed
on the immunity in planning their affairs. But not everyone was so
hesitant. A New Jersey judge in dissent has commented that the rule
was created without the aid of the legislature when the judges found
that such a policy would serve the public welfare. Now that the grounds
for the policy no longer exist the same courts have a duty to remove the
immunity.57
In modifying the immunity theory, the Supreme Court of Kentucky
used similar reasoning, noting that during the years subsequent to the
adoption of the immunity doctrine there has been an increase in both
social consciousness and the hazards of living. Justice required a limita-
tion of immunity of religious institutions in a situation where there was
corporate negligence in the operation of income-producing property,
resulting in injury to a non-beneficiary of the institution. 5s
Two states have recently dispensed with the immunity of charitable
hospitals. Ohio removed it altogether, 09 while Washington did so only in
the case of a paying patient. 60 Shortly afterwards, negligence suits were
brought against religious institutions in both states. The Washington
Supreme Court held that it had not intended to abandon the immunity
of religious bodies where they were rendering a gratuitous service to
56 The court did not state the arguments. Springer v. Federated Church, 71
Nev. 177, 283 P.2d 1071 (1955). A legislative enactment which covers this
problem is the "safe *place" statute of Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. § 101.06 (1955), which
requires that the owner of a public building maintain it in a safe condition. The
statute is applicable to buildings owned by religious groups. Watry .v. Carmelite
Sisters, 274 Wis. 415; 80 N.W.2d 397 (1957); Harnett v. St. Mary's Congregatior,
271 Wis. 603, 74 N.W.2d 382 (1956).
57 Jacobs, J., dissenting, Lokar v. Church of the Sacred Heart, 24 N.J. 549,
133 A.2d 12, 1523 (1957). This is a confusing case: The majority admitted that
there was no immunity, yet the dissent was taken up with favoring its abolishment.
58 Roland v. Catholic Archdiocese, 301 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1957)..
09 Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956).
60 Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 43" Wash. 2d 162, 260
P.2d 765 (1953).
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children in transporting them to Sunday School. 61 This distinction be-
tween hospitals and religious groups was utilized by an Ohio trial court
in preserving the latter's immunity. 62 In attempting to explain the dis-
tinction the court pointed out that the situation in hospital administra-
tion had changed, and that because of increased hospitalization insurance
the number of charity cases had declined. Since no change had occurred
in the status of churches, the policy considerations supporting the im-
munity were still valid. 63 Yet where another state had confirmed the
immunity of hospitals, a mere citation of that case was sufficient to
settle the problem for religious societies.64
Several interesting cases have involved a claim by the injured party
that he was an invitee while on church premises. In the case of a paying
hospital patient, where the claim was accepted, recovery was prevented
by an extension of immunity. 65 Another court handled the problem by
first inquiring whether the party had been invited on the premises, and
then asking if his presence resulted in mutual benefit to himself and the
landowner. Even though these questions were answered in the affirma-
tive, the court proceeded to treat the party as a licensee.6 6 Most refusals
to recognize a person as an invitee were on the same ground, that the
participant alone was the beneficiary of his religious activity whether
he was going to light a candle,67 do church work, 68 or making a contri-
bution.69
The distinction drawn between a charitable hospital and a religious
society as a proper subject for immunity from tort liability may be a valid
one. The method of the Ohio court of examining the real situation of
religious societies should be expanded to consider positively the position
of these groups in the modern social structure. There are activities of
religious bodies for which society has a right to expect the same legal
responsibility that the law imposes on other parties. The Kentucky court
has found a justification for this expectation in what it called an increase
in social consciousness and the hazards of modem living. In the difficult
determination of what ought to be expected from religious societies,
certain factors other than the nature of the activity itself suggest them-
selves as being relevant to the propriety of continued immunization of
the conduct in question. They are the degree to which the activity is
essential to the religious function of the society, the ease in obtaining
61 Lyon v. Tumwater Evangelical Free Church, 47 Wash. 2d 202, 287 P.2d
128 (1955). For criticism of the result see Comment, Questionable Status of the
Charitable Immunity, 31 WASH. L. Rav. 287 (1956).
62 Hunsche v. Alter, 145 N.E.2d 368 (C.P. Ohio 1957).
63 The strength of the policy in one jurisdiction was shown recently in a
diversity action. It involved the application of a Pennsylvania conflict of laws
rule that no action may be maintained which is contrary to the strong policy of
the forum. The accident in question occurred in New Jersey where there was no
immunity. But the trial judge found in Bond v. Pittsburgh, 368 Pa. 404, 84 A.2d 328
(1951) a sufficiently strong expression of public policy in favor of the immunity to
satisfy the requirements of the rule. Menardi v. Thea. Jones Evangelistic Ass'n,
154 F. Supp. 622 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
64 Parks v. Holy Angels Church, 160 Neb. 299, 70 N.W.2d 97 (1955);
applying Muller v. Nebraska Methodist Hospital, 160 Neb. 279, 70 N.W.2d 86
(1955).
65 Parks v. Holy Angels Church, supra note 64.
66 Lokar v. Church of the Sacred Heart, 24 N.J. 549, 133 A.2d 12 (1957).
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insurance to cover it,70 and the frequency with which such activities are
insured by other parties conducting them. In applying such tests, each
problem must be considered individually.
M. RELIGIOUS VALuSS
A. RELIGION IN THE COuRTs-Judicial Attitudes
The treatment of religious matters in litigation is highly influenced by
the judge's knowledge of the nature of the faith involved, and his ideas
on the nature of religion itself. This section will explore some of the
more definite judicial pronouncements on religion. It is intended to be
expository, more an attempt to point out the attitudes of a court than
analyze them. The latter is precluded by the limited amount of case
material available.
While considering the application of an ethical culture group for a
religious institution tax exemption, a California court was faced with
the issue of whether the group could qualify without recognizing the
existence of a Supreme Being.7 1 The court refused to follow the answer
given by the United States Supreme Court72 and many other courts that
such recognition is an essential part of a religion. The court followed
another rule which is in line with the ideas of certain modern thinkers;
that the notion of a Divine Being is not in any way necessary to a
religion.7 3 Furthermore, any distinction drawn by a state between theistic
and nontheistic cults would violate our traditions of tolerance and the
fourteenth amendment. The court asserts that any test used must be an
objective one, and proposes a formula that it claims is sufficiently non-
subjective: does the belief in question fill a void in the person's life and
thereby occupy the same place in that life as an orthodox religion.
According to the decision, a religion quantitatively includes a belief
in something, some kind of organized expression and observation of the
belief, and a system of morals.7 4
The Iowa Supreme Court recently examined the nature of the Christian
religion in a similar vein. 75 The case involved a contempt proceeding
for failure to follow a divorce decree instructing a mother to rear the
67 Coalbaugh v. St. Peter's Roman Catholic Church, 142 Conn. 536, 115 A.2d
662 (1955).
68 Springer v. Federated Church, 71 Nev. 177, 283 P.2d 1071 (1955).
69 McNutly v. Hurley, 97 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1957). For a fuller discussion
of this case see p. 430-31 inlra....
70 "Nor may we regard with complete detachment the availability of indemni-
fying and liability insurance." Roland v. Catholic Archdiocese, 301 S.W.2d 574,
578 (Ky. 1957).
71 Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 315 P.2d 394 Cal. App.
2d 1957). For discussion of the tax aspect of this case see p. 426 supra.
72 Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); accord, Berman v. United States,
156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946).
73 In Washington Ethical Soc'y v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127 (D.C.
Cir. 1957), the court reached the same conclusion using very similar reasoning.
For discussion of the tax aspect of this case see p. 426 supra.
74 For a similar notion that religion embraces more than a code of moral
conduct, see Angel v. Angel, 140 N.E.2d 86 (C.P. Ohio 1956).
75 Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 78 N.W.2d 491 (Iowa 1956). See 42 IowA L. RV,
617 (1957); 34 N.C. L. Rav. 509 (1956).
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child placed in her custody in the Roman Catholic religion. The court
held that the decree had been too vague; expert testimony would have
been required to answer many questions involved in it, and even then
the possibility of dogmatic differences might make an answer unattain-
able. Then, to explain the trial court's error, the opinion embarked on
a discussion of the meaning of Christian religion. Ultimately, it con-
tains a belief in and a worship of a Divine Being, the Father of man-
kind, who forgives repentants and cares for the souls of believers. This
belief brings comfort in this life to those holding it and induces right
living in them. All Christian religions are the same in this essential
respect. The nature of the mistake below was found to be confusion of
the term religion with the "cultus" or form of worship in the various
denominations. 76 The appellate court thought that where the decree read
"Roman Catholic religion" the trial court intended to refer to the "cultus"
of that Church. The decision suggested that the trial court might have
intended that the child be reared in the Christian religion under the dis-
cipline and dogma of the Roman Catholic Church. It is difficult to grasp
the distinction the court attempted to make. Even if the decree had
spelled out that the child was to be reared in compliance with the dis-
cipline and dogmas of the Romans Catholic Church, it is plain from
what the court had said that the decree still would have failed for lack
of clarity.77
The approach employed by the Iowa and California courts, one of
technical dissection, combined with a seeming uineasiness in dealing with
problems of faith, prevented religion from appearing in their opinions
as a solemn and deeply meaningful part of an individual's life. Where
the factual situation permits a court to deal with the nature of religion
more freely an opinion may well accord a dignity to religious experience
that was absent in the prior cases. An example is found in a recent
Florida case78 determining the status of an attendant at mass. The court
found the worshipper not an invitee but rather a licensee, one present
for his own benefit only, who confers no benefit on the landowner. The
decision rested on the notion that a universal part of religious belief is
the concept that participation in religious services is for the benefit of
the mortals who take part, and indeed it is impossible to explain the
activity in any other way. Places of worship exist as reminders of the
existence of a Higher Being, set apart from the material aspect of life,
76 This distinction was drawn almost seventy years ago by the Supreme Court
in Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890). The distinction seems to have meant
there and to some extent here that religious practices which will always be
protected, such as belief in a God, are indentifled as "religion"; and those which
are tolerated as long as they do not interfere with the rights of others, such as the
active implementation of a belief in polygamy, are called "cultus." The Court
has stated that the first amendment "embraces two concepts -freedom to believe
and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second
cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society."
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
77 The dissent denies that the decree is so abstruse as not to be understand-
able. In support of his position the judge discusses the widespread adherence to
the Catholic faith in America, and the. many activities in which its members are
involved. Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 78 N.W.2d 491, 504 (Iowa 1956).
78 McNutly v. Hurley, 97 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1957).
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where persons can exercise their beliefs in common with others. An
individual attending a service cannot contend, "... that she went to mass
for the benefit of Jesus Christ . . " or the Church. 79
Not all factual situations demand an involved discussion of the nature
of religion. At times courts find it possible to solve the problems that
the presence of religion causes by merely stating that all religions stand
in the same place before the law.8 0
Some judges, especially in the trial courts, display detailed knowledge
of religious practices and do not hesitate to use it in deciding cases. 8
Where a wife had refused for several years to baptise a child which
she had promised to rear as a Catholic, the court held that she. could not
be in compliance with her agreement because the precepts of that faith re-
quire almost immediate baptism.82 In an annulment action, a woman
claidmed that because of her devotion to the Catholic Church, a false
statement made by her husband at the time of their marriage that he was
a good practitioner was a material inducement for marriage. The court
rejected her claim because she had been married in a civil ceremony and
thereby had flouted the precepts of her faith.83 On the same issue, where
another court found that the plaintiff husband was "a practical and
devout Catholic" who "is a member of its Holy Name Society and
receives the sacraments regularly and frequently," a promise to rear
children in the Catholic faith was a material inducement to him in
marriage.8 4 As part of the marriage agreement a spouse had promised
to take instructions in the faith of his bride. He attempted to prove his
compliance by showing a single instance in which he had gone to the
place of instruction, but having been offended by something said there,
never returned. The court concluded that only after taking a full course
could his efforts be classified as having been made in good faith.8 5
79 Id. at 188.
80 McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 20 Conn. Supp. 278, 132 A.2d 420 (1957);
Angel v. Angel, 140 N.E.2d 86 (C.P. Ohio 1956).
81 Mere generality of idea does not prevent use of a court's knowledge in
judging conduct. Where a convert embarked on a cruel campaign to convert his
wife, a court observed, "it is inescapable not to conclude that the defendant did
not absorb the teaching of Christianity and Catholicism." Golden v. Arons, 30
N.J. Super. 371, 115 A.2d 639, 640 (1955).
82 Ross v. Ross, 4 Misc. 2d 399, 149 N.Y.S.2d 585 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
83 Musso v. Musso, 143 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 1955). See note 81
supra for a similar condemnation of a poor practitioner.
84 Ross v. Ross, supra note 82; see also Villani v. Villani, 207 Misc. 629, 139
N.Y.S.2d 724 (Sup. Ct. 1955) on the materiality of such a promise to a Catholic.
Acknowledgment of the meaning of religion to a believer has been made in a case
where it could not be legally recognized. In Hackett v. Hackett, 146 N.E.2d 477
(C.P. Ohio 1957), an antenuptial agreement on the religious training of children
was declared void, but the court said of the father who had asserted it, "Because
of his unusual closeness to his church, the words of 'The Pilot' (Mar. 6, 1954)
official organ of the Boston Archdiocese s6em appropriate: '... . for Catholics their
faith is their most treasured possession'." Hackett v. Hackett, supra at 482.
85 Howardell v. Howardell, 151 N.Y.S.2d 265 -(Sup, Ct. N.Y. Co. 1956),
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One visit did not indicate an abiding intent to embrace the faith and
provided evidence that the promise was made fraudulently.8 6
In connection with their treatment of religious problems courts some-
times have to consider the importance of tolerance or the lack thereof.
A New Jersey court has observed that persons are sensitive about their
religious beliefs, and insults which could be directed at the irreligious
without effect could grieviously hurt a devout adherent of a religion.
Relief from mental cruelty is designed to protect the sensitive and the
apathetic alike.8 7 But relief from intolerance is not always available
in the courts. As one decision has pointed out judges in this country
must often be tolerant of intolerance.88 In enforcing the provisions of a
will, for example, strong public policies of freedom of speech and the
distribution of property give support to a clause cutting off a child who
marries a person belonging to a certain faith.8 9 But courts are not
prevented from making strong statements in favor of tolerance where
the situation demands it:
It is a sad commentary, in this day, when tolerance and cooperation
between faiths. are fostered and advocated for the parent of one faith to
seek to deprive her child of the companionship and affection of the other
parent merely because the other parent's spouse is of a different faith.
Such attitude should not be encouraged. 9 0
As was said in the beginning, no real conclusions can be drawn from
a discussion such as this one. What can be said is that the ideas of
religion expressed in the decisions are as varied as the situations involved
in the cases and the backgrounds of the judges writing them, which in
turn partially explain the varying treatment of religion in judicial
opinions.
B. SUNDAY CLOSING LEGISLATION-A Suggested Solution
The historic legal deference to religious observance of the Sabbath in
the United States has caused extensive comment in recent years. At their
inception, Sunday laws were essentially a legal recognition of the relig-
ious convictions of the community,9 ' but recent interpretations of the
first amendment religious freedoms in McCollum v. Board of Education9 2
and Everson v. Board of Education9a have seriously altered the approach
of courts and legislatures in this area. The mutually exclusive positions
of Church and State in the first amendment established by these deci-
sions have shifted the emphasis of these laws from a religious to a public
health and welfare theme.94 There are, however, several inconsistencies
in this latter approach which have tended to perpetuate, rather than
obviate, the religious aspects of the problem.
86 At times the courts of New York seem unaware of the contents of the
Jewish faith, and in two cases noted the lack of evidence establishing the require-
ments of that faith where questions concerning it were raised. Koeppel v. Koeppel,
3 A.D.2d 853, 161 N.Y.S.2d 694 2d Dep't 1957); Gluckstern v. Gluckstern, 148
N.Y.S.2d 391 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1955).
87 Golden v. Arons, 36 N.J. Super, 371, 115 A.2d 639 (1955).
88 United States Nat. Bank v. Snodgrass, 202 Ore. 530, 275 P.2d 860 (1954).
89 Ibid.
90 Housman v. Housman, 285 App. Div. 1012, 139 N.Y.S.2d 24, 26 (4th
Dep't 1955).
91 PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 227-30 (1953).
92 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
98 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
94 See State v. Ullner, 143 N.E.2d 849 (Ohio App. 1957).
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Sunday closing statutes and ordinances9 5 have been drafted along two
distinct lines. One type is directed toward specific classes of commodi-
ties,9 6 the other toward certain types of businesses.9 7 (These classifications
may overlap when the retailer, such as an automobile dealer, sells only
a single product). The possibilities of discriminatory application are great-
er with this latter type where, for example, a grocer must close his doors
and stand idly by while a local drug store absorbs a portion of his
trade. But it has been held that this does not violate the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.98 Whereas if the statute prohibits
the sale of a particular commodity, all engaged in the business of selling
that commodity must close, resulting in a uniform application of the
law to an entire class of merchants. 99 And while the typical statute
contains broad prohibitions against all work and labor on Sunday, a a
most contain exceptions for works of charity or necessity.101 Even the
necessity exception has submitted to flexible interpretation. The Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the conviction of a grocer-who
remained open on Sunday because the state failed to prove that a grocery
store was not a necessity. 10 2 The court regarded the necessity provision
as varying from community to community and time to time.
The patchwork character of much of the law presently governing Sun-
day closing is revealed in the sometimes baffling inconsistencies of decis-
ion within the same jurisdiction. In New York, 103 for example, it has been
held that selling a book on Sunday does not violate the statute, even
though this is not within the named exceptions. 104 A firm of accountants
was held not to be engaged in "labor" within the meaning of the statute
by conducting an audit of corporate records on Sunday, 105 but the
gratuitous painting of a relative's house was sufficient to sustain a con-
viction106 And in a sharply criticised case a few years ago, it was held
95 The three classes of Sunday legislation are: (a) State-wide statute (most
common), LA. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 51:191 (1952); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 908(Supp. 1958); (b) City ordinance, Detroit Ordinance No. 781-E; (c) State statute
with local home rule option, NJ. REv. STAT. 2A 171-6 (1955); MASS. ANN. LAWS
c. 136, §§ 4A-B (1957).
96 N.J. Rav. STAT. 2A: 171-1.1 (1955) (automobiles).
97 Mo. REv. STAT. § 563.720 (1949).98 Taylor v. City of Pine Bluff, 294 S.W.2d 341 (Ark. 1956); Taylor v. City
of Pine Bluff, 289 S.W.2d 679 (Ark. 1955).
99 Gundaker Central Motors v. Gassert, 23 NJ. 71, 127 A.2d 566 (1956),
appeal dismissed, 354 U.S. 933 (1957); Humphrey Chevrolet v. City of Evanston,
7 Ill. 2d 402, 131 N.E.2d 70 (1956); Mosko v. Dunbar, 309 P.2d 581 (Colo. 1957)(statute does not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,
since it is class, rather than special legislation).
100 "No worldly employment or business ... shall be practiced by any person
within this state on the Christian Sabbath... ." N.J. REv. STAT. 2A: 171-1 (1955).
101 In works of necessity or charity-is included whatever is needful during the
day for the good order, health or comfort of the community. N.Y. PEN. LAW §
2143; CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 8603 (Rev. 1949).
102 Rich v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 445, 94 S.E. 2d 549 (1956). Apparently in
Virginia a presumption of necessity is with the merchant who remains open on
Sunday.
103 PFa RFn, op. cit. stupra at 230-35.
104 People v. Law, 142 N.Y.S.2d 440 (Munic. Ct. 1955).
105 People'v. Sacks, 150 N.Y.S.2d 22 (Magis. Ct. 1956).
106 People v. Deen, 3 A.D.2d 836, 160 N.YS,2d 962 (2d Dep't 1957).
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that two Orthodox Jews were guilty of violating the law by keeping a
grocery store open on Sunday, since the exception for those who con-
scientiously observe a Saturday Sabbath applied only to "work or labor"
and not to selling. l 07 The New York legislative scheme has been criti-
cised as an "illogical and inconsistent pattern," requiring major revisions
before there will be any definite meaning to the statutory proscriptions. l0 8
In order to sustain a conviction under an 1866 statute, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland was forced to interpret the phrase "opera house"
to include a drive-in motion-picture theater.109 Such examples, not at all
uncommon, point up the need for a drastic modernization of much of the
existing Sunday legislation.
New Jersey has experienced extensive difficulty in attempting to reform
its Sunday laws. Although the 1951 amendments were intended to bring
the laws up to date and omit obsolete provisions, the completed re-
vision contained no penalties for violations of the law. In State v. Fair
Lawn Ser. Center,110 the court held the statute unenforceable, so that
New Jersey presently has no effective law prohibiting the carrying on of
general business on Sunday. Despite this fact, the statute remains a
declaration of general state policy, so that even though unenforceable,
local ordinances may not be enacted that are inconsistent with its pro-
visions."' It now appears that the legislature intends to remedy this
situation piecemeal, since an amendment containing an appropriate
penalty was recently upheld by the Supreme Court of New Jersey, re-
quiring all auto dealers to close on Sunday. 112
Some statutes provide an exception for the person who conscientiously
observes the Sabbath on a day other than Sunday.1 13 Such religious
practices excuse the person from the general sweep of the statute and
allow him to remain open on Sunday, provided he closes on some other
designated religious holiday. However, there must be a conscientious
observance of this alternate day before the person is entitled to the
exception. 1" 4 The absence of such provisions in many of the statutes and
ordinances has brought forth protest from some that these laws are
107 People v. Freidman, 302 N.Y. 75, 96 N.E.2d 184 (1950), appeal dismissed,
341 U.S. 907 (1951); See also State v. Keich, 145 N.E.2d 532 (Ohio 1956), OHio
REv. CODE ANN. § 3773.24 (Page Supp. 1957); cf. In re Berman, 344 Mich. 598, 75
N.W.2d 8 (1956).
108 People v. Law, 142 N.Y.S.2d 440, 442 (Munic. Ct. 1955); see also People v.
Glasser, 2 A.D.2d 352, 155 N.Y.S.2d 700 (1st Dep't 1956).
109 Carrier v. Lynch, 121 A.2d 246 (Md. 1956).
110 20 N.J. 468, 120 A.2d 233 (1956), reversing 35 N.J. Super. 549, 114 A.2d
487 (1955).
111 Auto-Rite Supply Co. v. Woodbridge Township, 25 N.J. 188, 135 A.2d 515
(1957), affirming 41 N.J. Super. 303, 124 A.2d 612 (1956); Hertz Washmobile
System v. Village of South Orange, 25 NJ. 207, 135 A.2d 524 (1957), affirming 41
N.J. Super. 110, 124 A.2d 68 (1956). These cases seem to indicate that a local
ordinance would have to prohibit all business on Sunday in order to be consistent
with the policy of the statute.
112 Gundaker Central Motors v. Gassert, 23 N.J. 71, 127 A.2d 566 (1956), appeal
dismissed, 354 U.S. 933 (1957).
113 CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 8609 (1947). See also Commonwealth v. Chernak, 145
N.E.2d 920 (Mass. 1957).
114 State v. Keich, 145 N.E.2d 532 (Ohio 1956); In re Berman, 344 Mich. 598,
75 N.W.2d 8 (1956).
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coercive and violate the first amendment privilege of freedom of reli-
gion.115 And to the extent that courts continue to view these laws as
measures for the preservation of religious duty and devotion, this objec-
tion is well taken.
Courts have consistently equivocated in their decisions with respect to
the purposes and constitutional justification of these statutes. The main
objections, other than denial of equal protection under the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment, center on the religious free-
dom provision of the first amendment. Admittedly the historical purpose
of the statutes was to insure the fitting observance of Sunday worship.11 6
But the protests of those who observe the Sabbath on a day other than
Sunday have forced courts in recent times to find alternate justifications
for these laws. To satisfy these objections, the basis of decision has been
shifted from recognition of religious custom to state police power,117 a
day of rest being considered essential to a person's health. As the Ohio
Court of Appeals has said: 118
It is difficult -we think impossible-to make even a convincing argument
that such a law has any relation whatsoever to religion, that is, anything
to da with man's relation to his God.
While holding that the statutes are constitutionally grounded upon the
police power of the state, many courts admit that the purpose of these
laws is to preserve the religious tone of the day. 119 This has resulted in
a confusion of the real basis of decision.
In order to avoid the latent inconsistencies of these cases it would be
better for the courts to consider the selection of the day of rest as a
pragmatic declaration of public policy by the legislature, rather than
any formal acknowledgment of religious observance of the Sabbath.
With this clear constitutional justification adjustments could be provided
in order to accomodate various religious convictions and local custom.
Such a scheme would successfully avoid the McCollum objection, 2 0 as
the selection of the particular day of rest would not be controlled by
religious beliefs, but by the demands of public health.
Under this formulation of the problem, the primary emphasis-indeed
the sole emphasis-becomes the police power of the state. The exclusive
justification for Sunday closing legislation is the public health and welfare
of the community. As a matter of convenience and workability, Sunday
would be the day set aside simply because this is the day the vast majority
of people refrain from work. Appropriate provisions for alternate days
of rest, to fit the religious practices of the minority, would remove any
elements of coercion or abridgement of religious freedom. In summary,
the selection of the day of rest should be an arbitrary choice, having no
115 PFEFFER, op. cit. supra at 231.
116 See note 91 supra.
117 Commonwealth v. Grochowiak, 136 A.2d 145 (Pa. 1957); State v. Ullner,
143 N.E.2d 849 (Ohio App. 1957).
118 State v. Ullner, supra, note 117.
119 State v. Hurliman, 143 Conn. 502, 123 A.2d 767 (1956); Commonwealth v.
Grochowiak, 136 A.2d 145 (Pa. 1957).
120 "We renew our conviction that 'we have staked the very existence of our
country on the faith that complete separation between the state and religion is best
for the state and best for religion.' Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. at 59.
If nowhere else, in the relation between Church and State, 'good fences make good
neighbors'." 333 U.S. at 232 (concurring opinion).
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relation to the community's religious practices. Sunday is chosen as a
matter of convenience and accommodation only, and the congruence of
the statutorily authorized day of rest and the majority's day of religious
worship becomes accidental only. By thus eliminating the religious
justification of these laws, the entire area could be liberated from the
confusion and disagreement presently characterizing it.
C. OBSCENITY-The Emergence of a Legal Value
Obscenity has always occupied a penumbral region of the law. It is an
area in which religious institutions and organizations have been unusually
active' 21 because of its impact upon the moral disposition of the individ-
ual and his consequent social values.' 2 2 The historical difficulties courts
experienced in their attempts to achieve a socially satisfactory and con-
stitutionally acceptable definition of the term persist today in a multi-
patterned context. It was conceded early that obscenity was not guaran-
teed the constitutional protections of the first amendment, 23 but it was
not until recently that the Supreme Court passed down its own con-
stitutionally refined definition of the nebulous concept.124 This survey
has found, however, that the definitional difficulties in this area do not
spring from the semantic differences inherent in a pluralistic society, but
rather, from the inability of these various definitions to satisfy the con-
stitutional protections surrounding the vehicle of expression. With the
arrival of some moral agreement concerning the abstract definition of
obscenity has come a serious disagreement in its constitutional applica-
tion. Because of the great importance attached to the values of moral
welfare and freedom of expression in our society law and morals have
failed to coincide on the obscenity issue. Instead, a compromise, which
has not seriously altered either position, has effected the emergence of
a legal value to guide the state and the individual in this delicate situation.
1) LITERATURE-A Problem of Definition Resolved
Although all states' 2 5 and the federal government' 28 have recognized a
legitimate governmental interest in the moral welfare of their combined
121 For a detailed discussion of pressure group activity in this area, see Lockhart
and McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38 MINN. L.
Rav. 295 (1954).
122 The American Bishops Annual Statement, in National Catholic Welfare
Conference News Service, Nov. 18, 1957.
123 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877) (dictum).
124 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
125 New Mexico has no general obscenity statute but does give municipalities
power to prohibit sale or exhibition of obscene literature and pictures. N.M. STAT,
ANN. § 14-21-12 (1953). Representative state obscenity statutes are: CAL. PEN.
CODE § 311 (Supp. 1957); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.01 (1957); IL. ANN. STAT. c. 38,
§ 468 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1957); 4 IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-2803-4 (Supp. 1957); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 725.4 (Supp. 1956); MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 272 § 28(a) (Supp. 1957);
MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 617.24 (Supp. 1956); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:115-2 (Supp. 1956);
N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1141; OHio Rav. CODE ANN. § 2905.34 (Page Supp. 1957); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4527 (Supp. 1957); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3001 (Supp. 1957);
1 Tax. PEN. CODE art. 526-7 (Supp. 1957); Wis. STAT. § 351.38 (1951).
126 For a history of federal obscenity legislation, see Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 485 n.17 (1957).
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citizenry, it has taken time for the constitutional import of obscenity to
emerge in the case law. The original concern of the courts in this area
was post-publication punishment in accordance with an adequate stan-
dard of criminal behavior. As the litigation was focused upon the varied
formulae used in defining the obscene, a judicial assumption regarding
obscenity as beyond the constitutional protections of the first amendment
gradually developed. 12 7 Consequently, the tests for defining the obscene
developed as standards sufficient to define the nature of a criminal
offense, necessitating the exclusion of any first amendment implications.
The classical definition of the obscene as announced in Hicklin v.
Regina12 8 considered the effect of an isolated exerpt of the material upon
those whose minds were open to such influences. This formula was re-
jected by the American courts in United States v. One Book Entitled
Ulysses' 29 and replaced with the "dominant theme" standard which
arrived at the dominant purpose of the author by applying the con-
temporary standards of decency from the average person's perspective.
Complementing this standard with a plethora of epithets,' 30 courts and
administrative agencies have attempted to protect the community from
the harmful moral effects of the printed word, pictures, films and other
devices which have embodied the obscene. A growing social awareness of
the free speech guarantees of the first amendment, however, has prompted
a new and more vital opposition to government control in this area.13 1
Obscenity cannot be regarded as a legal problem alone, for the realistic
dimensions of artistic expression sometimes include situations which,
when standing apart from the art form, would be considered as offensive
to the community standards of decency. Recognizing this dual aspect of
the problem courts were forced to arrive at a statutory definition of obs-
cenity which would adequately proscribe the limits of community decency
to the offender without violating the integrity of the artist's work product.
A failure to observe the distinction between so abstractly defining the
obscene and applying that same definition to restrict what is alleged to
be constitutionally protected speech and press has created a constitutional
question which has not received a satisfactory answer. The contemporary
127 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283
U.S. 697 (1931); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); People v.
Doubleday & Co., 297 N.Y. 687, 77 N.E.2d 6 (1947), aff'd per curiam by an equally
divided Court, 335 U.S. 848 (1948); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
128 L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868). 1 :
129 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934); United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156 (2d- Cir.
1936); Parmelee v. United States, 113 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Commonwealth
v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E.2d 840 (1945); Bantam Books v. Melko, 25 N.J.
Super. 292, 96 A.2d 47 (1953). The Hicldin test is still valid, however, where the
statute is designed for the protection of youth only. See Commonwealth v. Donaducy,
167 Pa. Super. 611, 76 A.2d 440 (1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 949 (1951).
130 Courts and legislatures have employed a wide variety of adjective standards
in these determinations. Among the most popular are: ""immoral," "indecent,"
"inhuman," "lewd," "lascivious," "salacious," "filthy," "tending to corrupt, deprave,
induce, incite," etc.
131 McKEoN, MERTON, GELLHORN, THE FREEDOM TO READ (1957); BERaNs, FREE-
DOM, VIRTUE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1957); GELLHORN, INDIVmDUAL FREEDOM
AND GOvERzMENTAL REsTRAINTs (1956); THAYER, LEG.AL CONTROL OF THE PRESS
(1956); CHAFER, THE BLESSINGS OF LmERTY (1956); CHENERY, FaEDOM OF THE
PRESS (1955); CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1948); Note, 71
HARV. L. REv. 326 (1957).
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problem of obscenity legislation is an attempt, through a process of
definition, to control a constitutionally protected form of expression be-
cause of its obscene content, which has been historically exempted from
such protections. The distinction drawn here between form and content is
a procedural one proposed by the opponents of these laws in the prior
restraint phase of control. 132 When the legal action is preventitive (cen-
sorship) the distinction is a vaild one, for the obscenity determination
must await publication. 13 It is of dubious validity when carried over to
the post-publication prosection, however, as the form of expression be-
comes incidental to the criminal matter contained therein. Nevertheless,
the modern controversy does not concern the historical exemption of
obscenity from the free speech guarantees, but rather, the summary
dismissal of these protections which are accorded the vehicle of expression
on the basis of this exemption.' 34 Although a host of cases denied
obscenity a first amendment position, Schenck v. United States'3 5 made
it imperative that a "clear and present danger" of substantive evil exist
before governmental interference with speech and press would be
justified. As the press is involved in every obscenity determination
the opponents of obscenity legislation have insisted upon the Schenck
interpretation of the first amendment being satisfied before this type
of press be restrained, or its publisher prosecuted. The doctrine has
submitted to a flexible interpretation through the years13 6 and since the
decision in Dennis v. United States13 7 there is some doubt that it will
remain a valid interpretive guide to the first amendment. 13 8 Rejecting
the rigidity of the clear and present danger doctrine, rather than its
principles, the Court said in Dennis:
In each case courts must ask whether the gravity of the evil, discounted
by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary
to avoid the danger.139
132 "Our constitutional protection against preventitive censorship is soundly
grounded: it is freedom from previous restraints placed on publication; it does not
involve freedom from censure for matter reasonably found to be of criminal
character." McKEoN, MERTON, GELLHORN, THE FREEDOM TO READ 35 (1957); United
States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1956) (concurring opinion).
133 Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). In Winters v. New
York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), the Supreme Court gave some indication of this basic
conflict saying: "Acts of gross and open indecency or obscenity, injurious to public
morals, are indictable at common law .... When a legislative body concludes that
the mores of the community call for an extension of the impermissible limits, an
enactment aimed at the evil is plainly within its power, if it does not transgress the
boundaries fixed by the Constitution for freedom of expression." Id. at 515.
134 See note 132 supra.
135 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
136 MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF GOVERNMENT 28
(1948); CORWIN, THE CONSTIrUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 196 (1954); Antieau,
.clear and present danger' - Its Meaning and significance, 25 NOTRE DAME LAW.
603 (1950); Corwin, Bowing Out Clear and Present Danger, 27 NOTRE DAME LAW.
325 (1952).
137 341 U.S: 494 (1951).
138 "It can probably be safely said, on the basis of the Dennis holding, that the
'clear and present danger' formula will never be successfully invoked in behalf of
persons shown to have conspired to incite to a breach of federal law." CORWIN, THE
CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 200 (1954). See also Yates v. United
States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
139 Id. at 510. "In short, if the evil legislated against is serious enough, advocacy
of it in order to be punishable does not have to be attended by a clear and present
danger of sucess." CORWIN, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: ANN. 797 (1952).
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It would be imprudent at this time to project the Dennis variation of
Schenck, but it should be obvious that immediacy of action, whether it
be "probable" or "present" will remain an essential ingredient of the
first amendment cases. In this respect the clear and present danger ob-
jection must be considered.
The essential conflict takes position in the various definitions of
obscenity which have purported to remove the objectionable expression
from the first amendment guarantees. Included in every definition of ob-
scenity has been some reference to the effect the material must have upon
the viewer or reader.140 This effect has been generally satified under the
Ulysses rule if the tendency of the material is to arouse lustful thoughts, 14 1
or prove offensive to the community standards of decency.142 There has
been no necessity to relate the salacious thoughts of the reader to overt
conduct, as once it has been determined that these thoughts are aroused
the definition has been successfully applied and the constitutional question
presumably answered. It is at this point that the opponents of obscenity
legislation have injected the clear and present danger safeguard of the
first amendment, as the lustful thoughts of the reader or aroused
sense of community decency do not constitute a substantive evil which
would justify curtailment of the expression. The Hicklin test - though
deficient in other respects - could have satisfied a Schenck or, Dennis
interpretation of the first amendment, as it was concerned with the
effect the material would have upon those of a sadistic or masochistic
temperament The Ulysses formula, however, 'has removed any direct or
probable nexus between the sexual stimulation and overt conduct by im-
position of the "average person," as this hypothetical individual is less like-
ly to respond in action after contact with the objectionable material. Con-
sequently, the question of obscenity has been rephrased today as how
far governmental interference in the moral disposition of the individual
will extend. Both the proponents and opponents of these laws have
attempted to solve this dilemma by confused considerations of the
socially disruptive influences of the obscene.' 43 The unrealized source of
the confusion is a standard which cannot accomodate the dual aspects
of the problem.
The history and recent disposition of Roth v. United States' 4 give a
new but divided direction to the law of obscenity. The postal regulations,
which declare unmailable "every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent...
140 This aspect of the obscenity definition has included a) effect on thought, b)
effect on conduct, c) effect on community moral standards, d) offensiveness, and
even e) the probable audience of the particular material. For an excellent develop-
ment of these variations, see Lockhart and McClure, Literature, the Law of Ob-
scenity, and the Constitution, 38 MINN. L. Rnv. 329 (1954)..
141 Besig v. United States, 208 F,2d 142 (9th Cir.- 1953); Burstein v.. United
States, 178 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1949); United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564 (2d
Cir. 1930).
142 People v. Dial Press, 182 Misc. 416, 48 N.Y.S.2d 480- (1944); Parmelee v.
United States, 113 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
143 See Schmidt, A Justification of Statutes Barring Pornography From the Mails,
26 FORDHAM L. Rsv. 70 (1957); McKoN, MERTON, GELLHORN, THE FREEnoM TO
READ 35 (1957);, CHA'EE, THE JLEssINGs OF LmERTY 70 (1956). See also JAHODA,
HE IMPACT OF LITERATURE (1954); WERTHAM, SEnUCTION OF THE INNOCENT (1954).
144 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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article, thing, matter, device, or substance,"' 4 5 occupied the center of the
controversy. After conviction under these regulations for mailing an
obscene circular advertising the sale of objectionable material, the deal-
er-publisher appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
which affirmed the conviction because of the tendency of the material
to arouse lustful and impure thoughts.146 In his concurring opinion, 147
which was tantamount to a dissent, the late Judge Frank questioned the
constitutional validity of the postal prohibitions and penalties. Claiming
that government is concerned only with lawless, anti-social conduct and
not thought, Frank contended that more than a remote connection
between the objectionable material and socially undersireable conduct is
necessary to justify curtailment of the expression. Since no one has
shown with reasonable probability that obscene publications tend to have
any effect upon the behavioral patterns of normal, average adults,148
Frank asserted that government could not restrict the expression simply
because it tended to arouse lustful or impure thoughts. Projecting the
ultimate effects of such a practice he said:
If the government possesses the power to censor publications which arouse
sexual thoughts, regardless of whether those thoughts tend probably to
transform themselves into anti-social behavior, why may not the govern-
ment censor political and religious publications regardless of any causal
relation to probable dangerous deeds.149
In formulating his contention that a desireable purpose does not render a
statute constitutional, Frank relied upon cases which the majority used to
bolster its contention that the obscene is to be considered exclusive of the
first amendment protections. Although the dicta in. these cases does
support the historical position adopted by the majority, the factual
situations clearly demonstrate that the court has always required some-
thing more than mere tendency of thought to sanction suppression. 150
Restraint of expression by any form of censorship or prosecution has
received renewed attention in this age of colliding individual freedoms
and national security. It has been asserted recently that the conflicting
views in this area do not arise out of opposed conceptions of freedom,
but from vague definitions and assumptions concerning the social and
behavioral influences of obscenity. 151 While serving as an accurate identi-
fication of the conflict between existing obscenity definitions and the
145 69 STAT. 183, 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1955). In 1955 the Post Office Department
reported a 75% increase in pornographic mail traffic. N.Y. Times, March 6, 1955,
p. 70, col. 3. For the Senate report on the general language of the amended postal
regulations, see 2 U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD. NEws 2210 (1955). Implementation has
been successful. Schindler v. United States, 221 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1955) (post card);
United States v. Hornick, 229 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1956) (material advertised need
not be obscene; the gist of the offense is giving the information by mail).
146 Roth v. United States, 237 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1956).
147 Id. at 801.
148 See note 143 supra.
149 237 F.2d at 805.
150 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (imminent danger of riot due to
racial tensions); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (words tending
to provoke action on the part of the one addressed). For additional support Judge
Frank adds Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) and Winters v. New York,
333 U.S. 507 (1948).
':i1 McKEON, MERTON, GELLHORN, THE FREEDOM TO READ 96 (1957).
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present interpretation of the first amendment protections,' 52 these same
assertions cannot sustain a valid objection to obscenity legislation. A
constitutional basis for these laws can be found in a more fundamental
and positive interpretation of these constitutional guarantees.' 5 3 In this
respect it is unfortunate that criticism of Frank's thesis' 54 has been
confined to the cause of effect elements of the obscenity definition, for
contemporary sociological and psychological data does not confirm
any measurable relation between the objectionable material and the
viewer's social conduct.15 5 The absence of this causal relationship reduces
the criticism to the singular moral position of the individual which cannot
satisfy the first amendment objections to the definition.
Granting certiorari in Roth v. United States,'56 the Supreme Court
definitively settled one phase of the constitutional argument. For the
first time the Court was faced with the dispositive question as to whether
the postal regulations, and a California statute combined for hearing,' 57
violated the contsitutional provisions of the first amendment by imposing
criminal sanctions upon the purveyors of obscene literature. Disassociat-
ing obscenity and the first amendment, the Court declared:
In the light of . . .history, it is apparent that the unconditional phrasing
of the First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance....
[I]mplicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of
obscenity as utterly without any redeeming social importance.158
It is significant that the Court avoided consideration of an exact standard
in this area, thereby making it unnecessary to establish any direct
relation between the material and the reader's conduct. Relying upon
Ulysses and associated cases the Court found the safeguards of the "aver-
age person" standard adequate to withstand the charge of constitutional
infirmity. The standard announced was "... . whether to the average per-
son, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme
152 See note 143 supra.
153 Because freedom of the press is a basic right to be respected and safe-
guarded, it must be understood and defended not as license but as true rational
freedom.... To speak of. limits is to indicate that freedom of expression is not
an absolute freedom. The traditional and sounder understanding of freedom, and
specifically freedom of the press, is more temperate. It recognizes that liberty
has a moral dimension. Man is true to himself as a free being when he acts in
accord with the laws of right reason. As a member of society his liberty is
exercised within bounds fixed by the multiple demands of social living.
The American Bishops Annual Statement, in National Catholic Welfare Conference
News Service, Nov. 18, 1957. Compare this language with that of the Supreme Court
in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503: "Analysis of the leading cases in this
Court which have involved direct limitations on speech . . . will demonstrate ...
that this is not an unlimited, unqualified right, but that the societal value of speech
must, on occasion, be subordinated to other values and considerations." For the
legal development of the constitutional concept of morality, see Whelan, Censorship
and the Constitutional Concept of Morality, 43 GEo. L.J. 547 (1955).
154 Schmidt, A Justification of Statutes Barring Pornography From the Mails, 26
FORDHAM L. REv. 70 (1957).
155 There is no psychiatric consensus as to the effects of obscene literature upon
human conduct. See WERrHAM, SEDUcTioN oF THE INNOCENT (1953); JAHoDA, THE
ImPACr oF Lrra ATuR (1954); Abse, Psychodynamic Aspects of the Problem of the
Definition of Obscenity, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 572 (1955).
156 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
157 CAL. PEN. CODE § 311 (1955).
158 354 U.S. at 483-84.
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of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."'15 9 In its
more detailed definition of the term "obsenity", the Court relied upon a
recent draft of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code'60 as a
reflection of existing case law: 161
A thing is obscene if, considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is
to prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or
excretion, and if it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor
in description or representation of such matters.168
Answering the objection that a conviction was being obtained without
proof either that the obscene material will perceptibly create a clear
and present danger of anti-social conduct or will probably induce its
recipients to such conduct, the Court relied upon Beauharnais v. lllinoisla
saying, ". . . no one would contend that obscene speech, for example,
may be punished only upon a showing of such circumstances."'1 64 Con-
cluding that the words of the statute give adequate warning sufficient to
satisfy the due process requirements, the Court affirmed the convictions.
The Roth decision has clarified rather than concluded the legal prob-
lem of obscenity. The adopted standard does not meet the clear and
present danger requirement of the first amendmnt, for the Court's lan-
guage has not filled the gap between objectionable material and action-
able response. In substance, the Roth standard has only redressed the
Ulysses formula. But the constitutional question has been answered by
an interpretation of the first amendment more fundamental than the
technical construction of Schenck v. United States, for in basing its
decision upon an historical analysis of freedom in the first amendment
the Court has recognized that the moral dimensions of this freedom have
a social and constitutional importance which cannot be denied. 165 The
"action" which is prohibited is the publication or distribution of obscene
literature and not the "action" which might result on behalf of those
who read this material. With Roth, obscenity enters the same classifica-
tion as defamation-the danger being the present rather than future
consequences of the action. The evil need not be discounted by the im-
probability of its happening, as suggested in Dennis, for the evil has been
accurately defined to happen upon publication. In all probability the
courts will discard any future contentions which insist that overt anti-
social conduct must result from contact with the obscene material before
the publications be suppressed. Because the prurient interest standard
represents a philosophical solution to an extremely practical problem,
however, its application will require exacting discretion to preserve its
constitutional validity.
The problems of implementation have become apparent in cases follow-
ing Roth. In Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield' 66 a publisher sought
injunctive relief against the postal authorities for impounding a nudist
159 Id. at 489.
160 MODEL PENAL CODE TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 6, § 207.10 (1957).
161 The Court's alignment of the current case law definition of the obscene with
that of the model code has been criticized. See Schwartz, Criminal Obscenity Law:
Portents From Recent Supreme Court Decisions and Proposals of the American Law
Institute in the Model Penal Code, 29 PA. BAR Ass'N Q. 8 (1957).
162 354 U.S. 487 n.20.
163 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
164 354 U.S. at 486-87.
165 See note 153 supra.
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health magazine. The Post Office Department had found the magazine to
be ".... obscene and indecent when judged by the ordinary community
standards .. ," 167 The district court, after a page-by-page analysis of
the material, found that the pictorial presentations, principally of women,
which clearly revealed the genitals, breasts and other portions of the
body normally covered, did offend the community sense of decency and
upheld the Department's mail ban. The decision was affirmed five to three
on appeal' 68 but was reversed by the Supreme Court per curiam' 69 on the
basis of Roth v. United States. In a similar action for judgment declaring
a serious magazine for homosexuals to be mailable the Supreme Court
reversed the postal prohibition per curiam following the Roth decision. 17 0
The Supreme Court's disposition of these two cases has been subjected
to unwarranted criticism.' 7 ' Opposition to the decisions seems to be
based upon the sexual nature of the material presented in the periodicals
and the "average person" standard used to determine the obscenity of such
material. 172 In Roth the court was careful to distinguish between sex
and obscenity because of the legitimate public concern and corresponding
need for communication in matters of sex.175 In its application the ob-
scenity standard should not be expected to exclude from public con-
sumption all material which has a potential immoral use.174 The average
person and community decency elements of the Roth definition are
admittedly vague moral standards but constitutional necessities. This was
well illustrated in Butler v. Michigan175 where the Supreme Court struck
down a Michigan penal statute176 making it a misdemeanor to seel to the
general reading public any book "tending to the corruption of the morals
of youth," because it would reduce the adult population of Michigan to
reading only what is fit for children. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit recently followed suit reversing the conviction of a dealer who had
received allegedly obscene pictures from an express company because a
psychiatrist was permitted to testify as to the effects such pictures could
have upon the sexual deviate. 17 7 The sexual deviate classification of the
166 128 F. Supp. 564 (D.D.C. 1955).
167 Id. at 566.
168 249 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
169 78 Sup. Ct. 365 (1958).
170 One, Inc. v. Oleson, 78 Sup. Ct. 364 (1958), reversing 241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir.
1957).
171 The New World, Jan. 24, 1958, p. 4, col. 1.
172 "[T]here should be little reason to question the prurience of illustrated or
non-Illustrated magazines devoted to homosexuality or nudism... [T]he Supreme
Court must regard these themes as in accord with 'contemporary community stand-
ards'.... Ibid.
173 354 U.S. at 487.
174 Pictorial nudity has always posed interpretive problems which legal standards
cannot be expected to solve. For a recent account of this problem, see Paul and
Schwartz, Obscenity in the Mails: A Comment on Some Problems of Federal Cen-
sorship, 106 U. PA. L. Ra. 225 (1957). The problem has continued. United States v.
31 Photographs, 156 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (photographs imported for re-
search in sexual behavior).
175 352 U.S. 380 (1957). A similar statute in Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.01
(1957), will probably meet the same fate. See State v. Clein, 93 So.2d 876 (Fla.
1957).
176 MxcH. CoMP. LAws § 750.343 (1948).
177 Volanski v. United States, 246 F.2d 842 (6th Cir. 1957).
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Hicklin and Volanski cases and the youth objective of the Michigan
statute are classes particularly susceptible to an actionable response after
contact with the objectionable material, but they cannot serve as adequate
standards for adult reading material. In the Roth definition the Court
was forced to balance the clear and present danger requirements of the
first amendment with the due process mandate of statutory precision.
Although the "average person" is not always the suitable hypothetical
individual for testing the effects of the material,17s there must be some
equable or common standard for determining the obscene if this type
of publication is to be excluded from the first amendment protection.
The confined moral codes of various groups in society cannot fulfill such
a delicate function, for there is no doubt that a wide gap will often exist
between what is morally bad to a particular group and what should be
legally prohibited.17 9 If the standard were restricted to the psychiatric
and moral positions of particular segments in society, Butler v. Michigan
would obviate all obscenity legislation.
The dissent of Mr. Justice Harlan in Roth v. United States180 empha-
sizes the magnitude of this obscenity determination. In his statement of
the issue Justice Harlan appears to have adopted the position of Judge
Frank below:
In final analysis, the problem presented by these cases is how far, and on
what terms, the state and federal governments have power to punish individ-
uals for disseminating books considered to be undesirable because of their
nature or supposed deleterious effect upon human conduct.
(Emphasis added.) 181
Justice Harlan denies the validity of the majority's approach to the prob-
lem which centers upon an abstract definition of the obscene apart from
the first amendment protections as interpreted in the free speech cases. By
such a method he feels the decision is one insulated from the independent
constitutional judgment demanded by the safeguards attending the form
of expression.
I do not think that reviewing courts can escape this responsibility by saying
that the trier of facts, be it a jury or a judge, has labeled the questioned
matter as obscene, for if obscenity is to be suppressed, the question whether
a particular work is of that character involves not really an issue of fact
but a question of constitutional judgment of the most sensitive and delicate
kind.182
Harlan chooses not to confine the determination of obscenity to a
definition which includes no probable relation between mental stimula-
tion and overt conduct, for such a solution tends to smother the consti-
tutional question latent in each obscenity situation. The real thrust of
this argument is the constitutional difficulty inherent in a control of the
press because of its interlaced objectionable content. If the majority in
178 The average person is less likely to purchase or circulate such material. See
Lockhart and McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity and the Constitution, 38
MINN. L. Rav. 340 (1954).
179 "If we are content to accept as morally inoffensive all that is legally un-
punishable, we have lowered greatly our moral standards. It must be recognized that
civil legislation by itself does not constitute an adequate standard of morality." The
American Bishops Annual Statement, in National Catholic Welfare Conference
News Service, Nov. 18, 1957.
180 354 U.S. at 496.
181 Id. at 496-97.
182 Id. at 497-98.
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Roth was to avoid the clear and present danger complications in definition,
it had to decide the issue apart from this technical interpretation of the
first amendment. This was properly accomplished by an historical analysis
of the obscene which demonstrated that obscenity is without any redeem-
ing social importance and, therefore, not within these first amendment
protections. Harlan recognizes this dual concern of the court saying,
"[obscene] books [are] considered to be undesirable because of their
nature or supposed deleterious effect upon human conduct."' 183 (Emphasis
added.) He denies, however, any solution which considers only the nature
of the material because of the first amendment protections which should
attend the form of expression. Harlan's primary concern seems to be the
particular judgment which will disassociate the particular material from
the first amendment. In this respect each decision becomes an independent
constitutional judgment which will not admit a separation of form from
content. By focusing his attack upon the particularized judgment in the
obscenity determination, Justice Harlan may have established an equi-
poise between the obscenity definition and its implementation. Somewhat
paradoxically he concurs in Alberts v. California'84 because in this
instance the state legislature has made the judgment that the printed
word can deprave or corrupt the reader, and that words br pictures of this
nature can incite the reader to anti-social conduct. Although his reasons
for this concurrence could equally be applied to a similar Congressional
judgment, they seem to be based upon recognition of a direct state interest
in the general moral welfare, an interest he denies to the federal govern-
ment.
In Kingsly Books, Inc. v. Brown,18 5 a decision rendered the same week
as the Roth case, the Supreme Court affirmed the use of a significant
procedural device affecting the newstand control of objectionable litera-
ture. Pursuant to section 22-a of the New York Code of Criminal
Procedure' 8 6 local police officials received an injuction pendente lite to
suppress the sale and distribution of an allegedly obscene magazine,
Nights of Horror. In accordance with statutory provisions a hearing was
granted immediately to determine the obscenity of the material in ques-
tion and the injunction became permanent. On appeal to the Supreme
Court the distributor contended that the injunctive process constituted
an unconstitutional prior restraint of the press on the basis of Near v.
Minnesota ex rel. Olson. Recognizing the power of the state to protect
its citizens against the dissemination of pornography, the Court sustained
the procedure as adequate notice and a hearing were provided before
the order became permanent. It should be noted that the suppression in
the instant case did not involve future issues of the same magazine; it
merely restricted future sale of the particular issue considered. By direct-
ing the statute against the material after publication, but before mass
distribution, the legislature has successfully avoided the objections of
Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson and has presented a most effective
means of control.
183 Id. at 497.
184 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
183 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
186 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 22-a.
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These recent decisions aptly illustrate the serious issues involved in
the legal control of obscene literature. With its tenuous separation of
obscenity and the first amendment, the Roth decision has properly
denied that two fundamental values of society-freedom of expression
and the general moral welfare-are competing for recognition upon
the same constitutional grounds. The obscenity problem remains a con-
stitutional issue, however, as the particular determinations in this area
do involve constitutional judgment. The locus of the problem has been
shifted from the definition of the obscene to the particular judgment
which will disassociate obscenity from the closely related protections
of the press, and, as Justice Harlan has indicated, the decision is one
which cannot be isolated from constitutional considerations. In this
respect the Roth standard is a significant statement of policy, but its
implementation necessitates caution.
2) THE MOTION PICTURE-A New Analysis
The motion picture industry and its attendant legal problems have
grown in great complexity over the forty years prior to this survey.
The progress of legal development has failed to match the growth of
the industry, however, due mainly to the modern reluctance of the courts
and legislatures to deal with the delicate constitutional issues presented by
contemporary censorship of the film medium. The censorship process
has remained fairly uniform in procedure and substance with major
differences existing only as to the censoring authority. Originally ten
states' 87 had established state examination and licensing which pre-
empted consideration of the film throughout the state. Due to recent
constitutional doubts concerning the validity of motion picture censor-
ship this number has been reduced to four active censoring agencies on
the state level.' 8 8 Other states have preferred direct municipal control
of entertainment and exhibitions pursuant to state statute.189 The effect
of recent decisions on these forms of control is difficult to measure, 190
but the general absence of cases arising from municipal censorship
would seem to indicate that few formal attempts at censorship have
been made on this level.
187 KAN. GEN. STAT.'ANN. § 51-103 (1949); MD. ANN. CODE art. 66A (Supp.
1957); MASs. ANN. LAws c. 136 § 4 (Supp. 1957); N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 122, 122(a)
(Supp. 1957); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3305.04 (Page Supp. 1957); PA. STAT. ANN.
§ 43 (Supp. 1956); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2-98 - 2-116 (1950). States having similar
statutes but not enforcing them: FLA. STAT. § 521.01 (1955); LA. REv. STAT. § 4:304
(1950).
188 Kansas, Maryland, New York, and Virginia.
189 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-2329 (Supp. 1956); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 139-32-1
(72) (1953); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-126 (1957); 24 ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 24, § 23-57
(Smith-Hurd 1956) ("prohibit sale or exhibition of obscene or immoral picture");
IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-1407(39) (1950); IOWA CODE ANN. § 368.8(3) (Supp. 1956);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § § 85.150, 86.120, 98.010 (Baldwin 1955); MICH. CoMiP.
LAWS § 91.1(8) (1948); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 74.143(5) (1957) ("Cities of the first
class ... to censor moving picture films and shows and to prevent or suppress those
of vicious or harmful influence"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:52-1 (Supp. 1956); TEx.
Rnv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1175(22) (1953); VT. STAT. § 7650 (1947) ("when public
good requires"). California has no censorship statute, but the obscenity law refers
to "pictures and exhibitions." CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. § 311 (West Supp. 1957).
190 For a detailed report of local control in this area, see NOTE, 71 HARv. L.
REv. 326 (1957).
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Disregarding its earlier denial of free-speech guarantees to the motion
picture,' 19 the Supeme Court in 1952 originated a series of decisions
which has consistently deferred definition and clarity in this area. In Jos.
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,192 the Court struck down a New York prohibi-
tion banning a film for its "sacrilegious" content. The Court found the
term to be vague and indefinite which, when applied to the motion
picture in the form of prior restraint, offends the constitutional protections
of the first amendment as incorporated in the due process requirements
of the fourteenth.' 9 3 Considered apart from its successors the Burstyn
decision poses no problem. Further, the Court simply could not justify
any legitimate interest of the state in the religious offensiveness found to
exist in the film. As a foundation for later decisions, however, the case
is an unfortunate choice due to the lower court's apparent neglect-of its
true content. In Burstyn the Court recognized the validity of prior re-
straint in exceptional situations,' 94 but found the interest there not legit-
imate, nor the term sufficiently defined to satisfy the due process require-
ment of the fourteenth amendment. The Court did not decide whether a
state may exercise this form of prior restraint under a clearly drawn
statute designed to prevent the showing of obscene films.195
The delicate interrelation of these two constitutional issues - prior
restraint and statutory clarity - remained undecided in per curiam
decisions of three later cases at a time when the problems raised in
Burstyn could have been solved.' 9 6 The Ohio, New York, and Texas
courts believed the terms "immoral," "tending to corrupt morals," and
"in the public interest" sufficiently clear to justify the application of
prior restraint and denied the contentions of the industry that prior
censorship was unconstitutional per se. Instead of clarifying the position
of the state statutes in relation to the censors' determinations, the Court
reversed the state decisions on the basis of Jos. Bursyn, Inc. v. Wilson. The
concurring opinion of Justices Black and Douglas' 97 is a concentrated
attack on the doctrine of prior restraint alone as contrary to the con-
stitutional protections guaranteed the film medium in the Burstyn case.
It is reasonable to estimate, however, that here, as in Burstyn, the con-
stitutional objection was grounded on vague statutory language.
The confusion of these currently unrelated issues'9 8 posed difficult
191 Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm. of Ohio, 236 U.S. 244 (1915).
192 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
193 The Burstyn case was the first motion picture legislation tested after-Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U.S. 666 (1925), which incorporated the provisions of the first
amendment in the due process requirements of the fourteenth.
194 343 U.S. at 506. In Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 2 83U.S. 697 (1931),
the court limited the application of prior restraint to "exceptional cases." However,
"on similar grounds, the primary requirements of decency may be enforced against
obscene publication." Id. at 716.
195 343 U.S. at 506.
196 Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Educ. of Ohio (Commercial Pictures
Corp. v. Regents of the University of the State of New York), 346 U.S. 587 (1954),
reversing 159 Ohio St. 315, 112 N.E.2d 319 (1953); 305 N.Y. 336, 113 N.E.2d 502
(1953); Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952), reversing 157 Tex. Crim. 516, 247
S.W.2d 95 (1952).
197 346 U.S. at 588.
198 With the decision in Burstyn counsel for the producer saw an end to prior
restraint in the motion picture medium. The industry, however, was still confused.
N.Y. Times, June 3, 1952, p. 34, col. 2.
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problems for the state courts testing the constitutionality of their
censorship statutes on the basis of the Burstyn and Superior Films
cases. 199 The Ohio Supreme Court attempted to declare the Ohio law
unconstitutional following Superior Films, but due to the division of
opinion on the validity of prior restraint under a clearly drawn statute
the necessary majority could not be achieved to void the statute.200
The dissent in this case properly argued that the Supreme Court in the
Superior Films case, by relying upon the Burstyn decision, was consider-
ing the clarity of the statute as applied to the film under consideration
and not the constitutionality of the entire Ohio statute.' 0  The same
pattern was repeated in Kansas when the Kansas Supreme Court was
asked to decide the constitutional validity of the state censor's ban of
The Moon is Blue on the grounds that it was "obscene, indecent, im-
moral and [such] as would tend to debase or corrupt morals." Basing its
decision upon language not considered in the Burstyn and Superior Films
cases and the expertise of the censoring agency, the Kansas court upheld
the prohibition of the film, 20 2 but was reversed by the Supreme Court
per curiam on the basis of the Superior Films case.20 3
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, adopting the Burstyn progeny,
ruled the state censorship act unconstitutional when confronted with a
censor's determination that a film was "indecent and immoral," and
such as would "tend to debase and corrupt morals. '2 04 Despite a strong
dissenting opinion urging the limited nature of the Burstyn decision,
the majority found the statute vague in its vital area of definition. After
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had based this decision upon grounds
of indefiniteness another Pennsylvania court sustained the conviction of
a theatre operator for the exhibition of an "obscene" film previously
banned by the censorship board.20 5 By such action the Pennsylvania
courts have apparently gone one step beyond the United States Supreme
Court, for in permitting the conviction under a similarly worded statute
these courts have conceded that the words will admit of interpretation
and definition. The only possible conclusion of these Pennsylvania
199 The Supreme Court decisions produced ironical results. The state courts
were now permitting films to pass which had been denied the Motion Picture
Production Code seal of approval. N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1954, § 2, p. 1, col. 7.
200 RKO Radio Pictures v. Department of Educ., 162 Ohio St. 263, 122 N.E.2d
769 (1954). This decision effectively stopped film licensing in Ohio. The statute, OHIO
Rav. CODE ANN. § 3305.04 (Page Supp. 1957), empowers the board to approve only
those films which are of "a moral, educational, or amusing and harmless character."
One year later a revised bill to ban films "obscene ... or provocative of immediate
crime or [which] jeopardizes public safety," N.Y. Times, May 27, 1955, p. 15, col. 4,
failed to pass the Ohio Senate. Id., June 25, 1955, p. 9, col. 4. A new bill is pre-
sently under consideration in Ohio.
201 122 N.E.2d at 775.
202 Holmby Productions v. Vaughn, 177 Kan. 728, 282 P.2d 412 (1955). Before
the Kansas Supreme Court received this case the legislature had repealed the censor-
ship legislation, KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-103 (1949). N.Y. Times, April 8, 1955,
p. 16, col. 4.
203 Holmby Productions v. Vaughn, 350 U.S. 870 (1955).
204 Hallmark Productions, Inc. v. Carroll, 384 Pa. 348, 121 A.2d 584 (1956); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 43 (Supp. 1956).
205 Commonwealth v. Blumenstein, 184 Pa. Super. 83, 133 A.2d 865 (1957); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4528 (Supp. 1956).
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decisions is that the fact of prior restraint forbids any attempt at censor-
ship, even under a clearly drawn statute.
Early in 1955 the Massachusetts supreme court interpreted the
Burstyn decision as a condemnation of prior restraint alone and accord-
ingly ruled a Sunday censorship law invalid.20 6 Two years later the
same court indicated that it would affirm the conviction of a theatre
manager who exhibited an obscene picture contrary to the state obscenity
statute if the film was judged obscene by a jury.20 7 In its decision render-
ing the Sunday law unconstitutional this court should not have reached
the prior restraint issue, as the statute was vague enough to fail the due
process requirements. In basing its decision on the censorship law upon
the prior restraint issue alone, however, the Massachusetts court can
avoid the Pennsylvania paradox when and if it is confronted with a
future censorship law similarly worded to the obscenity statute.
The apparent readiness of the Pennsylvania and Massachusetts courts
to dismiss censorship activity is in sharp contrast with the reluctance
of the New York courts to tamper with their already-questioned stat-
ute,208 and the cautious judicial interpretation of a similar Maryland
statute.2 09 The New York courts have failed to sustain the censorship
of any film banned in that state since the Superior Film case, apparently
reserving the final test of the New York statute for an "exceptional case."
Nudity was not regarded as obscene per se in one case,2 10 and a spurious
educational film was permitted to pass in another.2 1 Maryland has
elected to treat the motion picture as a true medium for the communica-
tion to ideas and has redesigned its film legislation along lines more
acceptable to first amendment objections.2 12 Out of forty-three films
which were altered or banned by the Maryland State Board of Motion
Picture Censors during a recent two year period only two have ended
in litigation.2 13 The Maryland Courts in applying the statute have re-
quired that an objectionable passage have some measureable effect upon
206 Brattle Films, Inc. v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 333 Mass. 58, 127 N.E.2d
891 (1955); MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 136, § 4 (Supp. 1957).
207 MAss. ANN. LAWs c. 272, § 28(a) (Supp. 1957); Commonwealth v. Moniz,
143 N.E.2d 196 (Mass. 1957).
20s N.Y. EDUC. LAW § § 122, 122(a) (Supp. 1957). The statute was questioned
in Jos. Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) ("sacrilegious"); Commercial
Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University of the State of New York, 346 U.S. 587
(1954) ("immoral").
209 MD. ANN. CODE art. 66A (Supp. 1957). The same statute is now in force
in New York and Kansas. See note 187 supra.
210 Excelsior Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University of the State of New
York, 3 N.Y.2d 237, 144 N.E.2d 31 (1957). A theatre operator was convicted under
an obscenity statute in Massachusetts recently for showing the same film, Garden
of Eden. Commonwealth v. Moniz, 143 N.E.2d 196 (Mass. 1957).
211 Capitol Enterprises, Inc. v. Regents of the University of the State of New
York, I A.D.2d 990, 149 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1956). The film in question was Mom and
Dad. The review of the picture, "Sex and Violence Star in Central's Double Bill,"
was not in accord with the court's educational interpretation, even though material
for "sexual enlightenment" was sold in the theatre after the showing. N.Y. Times,
Jan. 31, 1957, p. 21, col. 1. The same picture was banned by the Ohio censors but
reversed in Capitol Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Educ., 162 Ohio St. 263, 122
N.E.2d 769 (1954).
212 See note 209 supra.
213 Note, 71 HARv. L. Ray. 326, 339 n.93 (1957).
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the viewer before alteration or prohibition of the film would be per-
mitted. Nudity escaped the censor's ban in one case because it was con-
tained in a documentary presentation. 214 Although it was unnecessary
to decide any constitutional question in that case, the Maryland Court
of Appeals indicated that it would uphold the statute. In the only other
film to reach litigation the same court refused deletion of a scene from
The Man With a Golden Arm, which the censors determined would
"teach the use of narcotics," a specific prohibition of the statute.2 15
Comparing the new statute with the first amendment provisions of the
Smith Act216 the court decided that the statute is not directed at the plain
presentation of the harmful habit, but only against presenting the
objectionable conduct, here, use of narcotics, in such a desireable fashion
as to impliedly advocate its repetition.
The United States Supreme Court has indicated that the existing
procedure for licensing motion picture films is a form of prior restraint2 17
but has declined to enter any direct comparison of the process with that
condemned in Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson.218 As the courts have
found no problem in post-exhibition prosecutions of obscene films, 219
the constitutional objection to censoring the film must be situated in the
relationship of the statutory standard to the fact of prior restraint. In the
Burstyn case the censor's ban failed, not because the state had access
to the film before exhibition, but because the term "sacrilegious" did not
provide an adequate standard to justify the screening before exhibition.
In this respect it is significant that each subsequent per curiam reversal of
state film prohibitions has been based upon either the Burstyn case or
Superior Films, which followed Burstyn. The reserved question in
Burstyn has been perpetuated rather than solved in the subsequent
decisions.
The language in Burstyn seems to imply that the Court has recognized
a substantial difference between the art form of the motion picture
and those which employ the written word alone, as "each method tends
to present its own peculiar problems. '220 The most significant difference,
implied from this language and the silent per curiam line, is that govern-
mental interference before public exhibition of the film might be toler-
ated if done under a clearly drawn statute.
It does not follow that the Constitution requires absolute freedom to
exhibit every motion picture of every kind at all times and all places.
...Nor does it follow that motion pictures are necessarily subject to
the precise rules governing any other particular method of expression.
(Emphasis added.)221
214 Maryland State Bd. of Motion Picture Censors v. Times Film Corp., 212 Md.
454, 129 A.2d 833 (Md. App. 1957). The film was Naked Amazon.
215 United Artists Corp. v. Maryland State Bd. of Motion Picture Censors, 210
Md. 586, 124 A.2d 292 (Md. App. 1956); MD. ANN. CODE art. 66A (Supp. 1957).
In 1956 the Motion Picture Production Code restrictions were eased to permit films
dealing with narcotics, abortions, prostitution, and kidnaping. N.Y. Times, Dec. 16,
1956, § 2, p. 3, col. 8.
216 70 STAT. 623 (1956), 18 U.S.C.A. § 2385 (Supp. 1957).
217 Jos. Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
218 See note 194 supra.
219 Commonwealth v. Moniz, 143 N.E.2d 196 (Mass. 1957); Commonwealth v.
Blumenstein, 184 Pa. Super. 83, 133 A.2d 865 (1957).
220 343 U.S. at 503.
221 Id. at 502, 503.
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If the Court were to permit the pre-exhibition testing of the picture this
would clearly diffierentiate "exhibition" of a film from the "publication"
of the printed word and perhaps draw the line of objectionable prior
restraint at different places in each medium. Although "the first amend-
ment draws no distinction between the various methods of communicat-
ing ideas," 222 such a statement has reference to the forms of expression
only as a constitutional conclusion and not as an analysis of the individ-
ual art forms. Chief Justice Warren, concurring in Roth v. United
States,2 2 3 issued an obvious warning to those who would apply the Roth
definition in the prior restraint phase of control, saying, "It is not the
book that is on trial; it is a person. ... A wholly different result might
be reached in a different setting. '2 24 The Chief Justice occupied a
minority position in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown,2 25 however, when he
said: "it is the conduct of the individual that should be judged, not the
quality of art or literature. To do otherwise is to impose a prior restraint
and hence to violate the Constitution." 226 It would seem, then, that the
Court could justify a different application of the first amendment provi-
sions to the various media of communication if the applications were
based upon substantial differences in the forms of expression. 227
It is precisely the active content of the motion picture "which -differen-
tiates the medium from those dependent upon the written word, and
which eventually will permit "trial" of the film. Literature, because of
its reliance upon the phantasm of the reader for effective communication,
is an art form which does not lend itself to screening before publication.
Prior to publication the only standard for determination would be an
estimation as to the effects such expression would have upon its readers.
As this translation of subjective stimulation into action is the peculiar
province of the individual which will not submit to measurement, govern-
mental interference based upon such a standard at this point would
amount to thought control as well as a forbidden prior restraint. The
motion picture, however, is primarily an exhibition - a mechanical
reproduction of conduct - which depends upon dramatic action for
conveyance of its message. As the state may easily determine the social
value of measureable conduct,228 it is entirely unnecessary to publicly
exhibit the activity before governmental interference may be justified.
The standard employed should vary with the grounds for opposition
to the film. As the film is an expression by means of dramatic action it
will "affect public attitudes and behavior in a variety of ways, ranging
from direct espousal of a political or social doctrine to the subtle shaping
222 Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Educ., 346 U.S. 587, 589 (1954) (con-
curring opinion).
223 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
224 Id. at 495.
225 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
226 Id. at 446.
227 Justices Douglas and Black are more concerned with different treatment
being accorded the motion picture because of its greater impact or force upon the
viewer. Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Educ., 346 U.S. 587, 588 (1954) (con-
curring opinion). In this connection see, THE PAYNE FOUNDATION, MOTION PICTURES
AND STANDARDS OF MORALITY (1933).
228 Cf. Adams Newark Theatre Co. v. Newark, 22 N.J. 472, 126 A.2d 340 (1956),
aff'd per curian, 354 U.S. 931 (1957).
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of thought which characterizes all artistic expression. '229 Where opposi-
tion to a film is based upon vulgar or brutal conduct and vivid pre-
sentations of human body areas not normally exhibited in public, there
should be little difficulty in distinguishing the motion picture from a
work of literature. In the literature situation the objection at this point
would have to be directed at estimated behavioral effects of the material
upon the reader, as the descriptive written word alone provides no
measureable objective. In the motion picture, however, the objection
would not be aimed at the viewer's conduct, but at the measureable
activity which is to be exhibited publicly. Statutory prohibitions similar
to those upheld recently in Adams Newark Theatre Co. v. Newark230
could define the permissable limits of such physical disclosures and
activities on the screen. The general language formerly found unaccept-
able as a standard would be supplanted by a detailed description of body
areas and activities which may not be exhibited in public. Where objection
to a film is grounded upon a suggesitve theme or direct spoken espousal
of immoral practices the applicable test would be that employed in judg-
ing obscene literature,231 for as the picture depends more upon artistic
subtlety for conveyance of its message the standard will become more
indefinite and incapable of measuring the objectionable activity. In its
most recent ruling, Times Film Corp. v. Chicago,232 the Supreme Court
reversed the Chicago Police Commissioner's ban on the controversial
film, Game of Love, on the basis of Albert v. California.2 33 In its
acceptance of the Alberts decision as a gauge the Court has apparently
chosen to apply the literature standard of obscenity to the film
medium, 234 and has thereby impliedly admitted that the "obscene"
would be a sufficient standard to justify the exercise of prior restraint
in this area. 235
The preceding analysis is not an attempt to divest the motion picture
of its constitutional guarantees but to justify a needed pre-exhibition
229 Jos. Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952).
230 22 N.J. 472, 126 A.2d 340 (1956), aff'd per curiam, 354 U.S. 931 (1957).
The ordinance enumerates certain genital and other areas of the body which may
not be disclosed in public, nor by costumes which give illusions of nudeness in these
areas.
231 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). An example of the suggestive
theme opposition is that offered by the Kansas censors' determination respecting
The Moon is Blue: "Sex theme throughout, too frank bedroom dialogue: many sexy
words; both dialogue and action have sex as their theme." Holmby Productions v.
Vaughn, 177 Kan. 728, 282 P.2d 412, 413 (1955), reversed, 350 U.S. 870 (1955).
Such a description would hardly satisfy the "prurient interest" standard and the
film would most likely pass uncut
232 26 U.S.L. WEEK 3147 (U.S. Nov. 12, 1958) (No. 372), reversing per curiam,
244 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1957).
233 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
234 The Times Film case is the first motion picture decision to be reversed on a
decision other than Burstyn or Superior Films. It is generally believed that the court
viewed the film before rendering its decision. N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1957, p. 40, col. 1.
235 The open question in Burstyn has apparently been answered, i.e., the state
may censor motion picture films under a clearly drawn ("obscene") statute.
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appraisal of current films. 2s 6 Although the Supreme Court has not
expressly defined the relation between statutory standards and prior
restraint in this area, there are indications28 7 that censorship may be
acomplished under an adequate standard for objective measurement of
the film medium.
D. DOMESTIC RELATIONS-A Reconciliation
In family law there were few innovations during the survey period;
but this should not be surprising, since the problems of domestic relations
are dealt with in highly individualized situations. The trial courts have
great importance in the ultimate determination of domestic relations law,
first, because there are few appeals, and, secondly, because the trial judge
is accorded a wide discretion which is usually respected by the appellate
courts.
1) SEPARATION AND DIVORCE-A Value Denied
In several recent divorce and separation actions the litigants have
unsuccessfully attempted to support their contentions or excuse their
conduct on religious grounds. Mere refusal of intercourse on religious
grounds was not a sufficient ground for divorce in Pennsylvania.238 And
in New York a wife who had refused to participate in the marriage act
for religious reasons was barred from obtaining a separation, since her
refusal was without valid legal excuse28 9 under an application of the
rule in Mirzio v. Mirzio2 40 that such refusal is a violation of the marriage
agreement. In another case, a husband attempted to justify the abandon-
ment of his wife because of her change of religious faith. He claimed
that where two Jews are married before a rabbi there arises an agree-
ment that the couple will lead their lives in accord with the Jewish faith,
and that if a spouse abandons that faith the agreement is broken and the
other spouse is entitled to abandon the breacher. The court could find no
evidence that such was the Jewish precept, but commented that such a
rule could not provide an excuse for abandonment under the secular law
and that to make religious differences standing alone a ground for
separation would violate the freedom of religion.241
The question whether religious beliefs excuse certain conduct is irrele-
vant where. a married person attempts to convert his spouse to his faith
through a course of conduct which in itself constitutes cruelty and
286 Although some of its listings are questionable, for the first year of the survey
period the National Legion of Decency found fewer objectionable movies than in
the previous twelve months (10%), but at the same time expressed serious concern
over the "intensity of objectionability" in the films it reviewed. N.Y. Times, Nov. 20,
1956, p. 46, col. 2. For an excellent account of the philosophical confusion in this
area see Clancy, The Catholic as a Censor, 68 COMMONWEAL 142 (1958).
237 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Adams Newark Theatre Co. v.
Newark, 354 U.S. 931 (1957); Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 26 U.S.L. VEEK 3147
(U.S. Nov. 12, 1957) (No. 372).
288 E. F. v. G. H., 4 Cumberland L. J. 42 (Pa. 1956).
239 Diemer v. Diemer, 149 N.Y.S.2d 146 (Sup. Ct. Queens Co. 1956).
240 242 N.Y. 74, 150 N.E. 605 (1926).
241 Gluckstem v. Gluckstern, 148 N.Y.S.2d 391 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1955),
modified on appeal, 2 App. Div.2d 774, 153 N.Y.S.2d 184 (1st Dep't 1956). Seq
also Booke v. Booke, 207 Misc. 999, 141 N.Y.S.2d 580 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
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grounds for divorce.24 2 In speaking of the right to freedom in choice of
religion, a court recently took cognizance of violations of that right,
including conduct between spouses which amounted to extreme cruelty. 243
No theory of religious freedom will excuse cruelty motivated by religious
zeal,244 and acts themselves rather than the irreligious cause, are deter-
minative.24 5
The clash between the legal obligation and religious duty is not often
won by the latter in the courts.2 46 Relief from the rule that a religious
excuse is no excuse may probably be had only from the legislature. On
the question of child placement, many legislatures have provided that a
certain weight must be given to religious affiliation in the placing of
children with adoptive parents. 247 A statute which recognizes religious
grounds in general might be difficult to administer since it is not always
clear what a religion requires of its adherents, or indeed what is a reli-
gion.248 Any statutory relief would probably raise constitutional questions,
although constitutional objections not yet proved fatal to the adoption
statutes.249 Despite the difficulties, the real need of the persons who are
affected by this problem indicates that the effort should be made to find
a solution.
2) AGREEMENTS-Continued Resistance
One of the often recurring problems where domestic relations law
and religion meet is that of the enforcement of agreements made by the
parties to a marriage or a separation.
250
A recent New York case involved an action for annulment based on
fraud in making an agreement to participate in a religious ceremony after
the civil ceremony. The marriage was never consummated, and the hus-
242 On conflicts arising from religious differences, see Note, 3 ST. Louis U.LJ.
253 (1955).
243 Golden v. Arons, 36 N.J. Super. 371, 115 A.2d 639 (1955). See Gluckstern
v. Gluckstern, supra note 241.
244 Stanton v. Stanton, 100 S.E.2d 289 (Ga. 1957).
245 Gluckstern v. Gluckstern, supra note 4.
246 Illustrative is this statement by an Ohio court:
The Catholic father would be well within his rights were he to place pre-
servation of his faith above preservation of his family. Unfortunately for
him, while the former may take precedence over the latter in an eccles-
iastical tribunal, no faith or religious dogma may ever take precedence over
a state constitution in a state court. Hackett v. Hackett, 146 N.E.2d 477
(C.P. Ohio 1957).
In Utah, a family which was the result of a polygamous marriage was deprived of
its children on the ground that the home life was immoral. The defense offered with-
out success was that the law of God commanded polygamy, and that the law of man
was simply inferior. In re State in Interest of Black, 3 Utah 2d 315, 283 P.2d 887
(1955). See 28 RocKy MT. L. REV. 138 (1955).
247 For a statute which is construed to require the court to award the child to
a person of the same religion whenever practicable, see MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 210,
§ 5 B (1955), interpreted in Petition of Gaily, 329 Mass. 143, 107 N.E.2d 21
(1952); for one which is construed to leave the matter more freely in the discretion
of the court, see ILL. REV. STAT. c. 4 § 4-2 (1955), interpreted in Cooper v.
Hinrichs, 10 Il. 2d 269, 140 N.E.2d 678 (1955).
248 See supra, pp. 429-30.
249 See infra, pp. 460-61.
250 For a general discussion of the problem see Comment, 34 U. Da'r. L. J. 632
(1957).
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band refused to go through with the church marriage. In denying the
annulment the court reiterated what it considered to be the fixed policy
of the state, that agreements such as the parties entered into cannot affect
their legal obligations arising from the civil ceremony. The status of
marriage is too important a matter of public concern to allow the parties
to tamper with it.251 Neither can a private agreement not to seek a divorce
confer jurisdiction on a court of equity to prevent either party from
obtaining a decree. Only the statutes confer jurisdiction over divorce. 252
Courts have frequently considered the constitutional problem involved
in the enforcement of these agreements.253 A Connecticut court found
that judicial support of an agreement to rear a child in a certain faith
would violate the state constitution which provides25 4 that no person
shall be compelled to be classed with or join or be associated with any
religious body.255 But three years previously the highest court of that
state upheld a decree placing a child in a Catholic convent school as not
violative of that same constitution and as a wise exercise of discretion
under the circumstances. The appellate court stated that the decree did no
more than provide that the child be trained in the faith into which she
was born and baptized, and did not prevent her from making her own
choice of religion when she reached the age of discretion. 256 An agree-
ment to send a child to a Catholic school was void in Ohio as violative of
the state constitution 25 7 which provides that no one shall be required to
support a religion. 258 The court reasoned that sending a child to a
denominational school amounted to support of that denomination in the
meaning of the constitution and the enforcement of the agreement would
also violate the federal constitution as interpreted in the McCollum
case.259
On the other had a recent New York case displayed a most sympathetic
attitude toward these agreements. In speaking of the right to the promised
performance the court stated that it "cannot be treated lightly and
although it is but a spiritual right, it is nonetheless as real and as valuable
as any property right."2 60 In apparent support of this attitude the court
suggested that the custody agreement which it had ordered to be made
contain "an unqualified stipulation" in accordance with the antenuptial
agreement that the child be enrolled in a parochial school; or if enrolled
in a public school, that the mother execute the permission necessary for
released time instruction, and that she have the duty of educating and
rearing the child in the Roman Catholic faith. The court's suggestion may
251 Lorifice v. Lorifice, 148 N.Y.S.2d 578 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1956). See also
Vail, Annulment in Church and State, 5 Da PAUL L. REv. 216 (1956).
252 Dumais v. Dumais, 152 Me. 24, 122 A.2d 322 (1956). See 37 B.U.L. REv.
146 (1957).
253 For a general discussion of the problem see Note, 64 YALE L.J. 772 (1955).
254 CONN. CONST. art. 7, § 1 (1818).
255 McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 20 Conn. Supp. 278, 132 A.2d 420 (1957).
256 Sullivan v. Sullivan, 141 Conn. 235, 104 A.2d 898 (1954).
257 OHIo CoNsT. art. 1, § 7 (1851).
258 Hackett v. Hackett, 146 N.E.2d 477 (C.P. Ohio 1957).
259 McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
260 Ross v. Ross, 4 Misc. 2d 399, 149 N.Y.S.2d 585, 589 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
1958) NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
have gone far in enforcing the original agreement, since in event of a
failure to agree on the terms of custody, the child was to go to the
Catholic father.
Where the training of children was not involved, one court gave
direct support to an agreement with religious elements. A wife sought
enforcement of the separation agreement in which her husband had
promised to go before a rabbi and obtain a divorce under the Jewish
law.2 61 A constitutional objection was made to judicial enforcement of
the agreement. The court held that being forced to go before a religious
official and to give evidence was not equivalent to being forced to practice
a religion. The husband would be merely required to do what he had
promised.262
Two thoughts drawn from these decisions are worthy of consideration
as leading toward fair and just results. The first is simply that these
promises, regardless of constitutional ban, are solemn obligations of
deep importance to the obligee. 263 They are often material to his hap-
piness and as such present a real claim to a society which has recognized
the enforcement of obligations as conducive of the common good.
The second, a corollary of the first, is that each situation is worthy
of an independent examination such as was made in the last case, to
determine if the conduct required by the premise is really of the kind
immonized by the constitution from judicial enforcement. No quarrel is
made here with all refusals to enforce an agreement. Even where the
techniques suggested are followed the judge may still decide against en-
forcement. The purpose of these suggestion is to promote through an
increased awareness of the importance of these agreements the reduction
of any needless denials of relief on constitutional grounds.
3) THE CHILD'S PREFERENCE-A Retrogression
The courts of New York and New Jersey have recently considered
the importance to be accorded to wishes of children on religious matters
when settling their custody. Consultation is a step in the custody process,
an aid in determining the best interest of the child. Where the expressions
of children are given great weight it can present a major barrier to the
enforcement of ante-nuptial agreements which seek to regulate the rearing
of children.
The most important recent case, Martin v. Martin,2 64 arose under a
custody order following a separation which provided that the child of the
marriage be reared a Catholic in accord with a premarital agreement.
Petition was made by the mother who had custody for a modification
permitting the child to be instructed in another faith. A referee found
261 On the problems caused by the divorce requirements of the Jewish faith and
efforts to meet them through agreements, see Comment, 23 U. CH. L. REV. 122
(1955).
262 Koeppel v. Koeppel, 138 N.Y.S.2d 366 (Sup. Ct. Queens Co. 1954); dis-
missed after referral by the trial court to a referee for failure to show that the con-
tract had become operative, 3 App. Div. 2d 853, 161 N.Y.S.2d 694 (2d Dep't 1957).
263 See supra, p. 000.
264 Martin v. Martin, 283 App. Div. 721, 127 N.Y.S.2d 851 (2d Dep't), afj'd
per curiam, 308 N.Y. 136, 123 N.E.2d 812 (1954). See also Comment, 34 U. DET.
L.J. 632 (1957).
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that the change would be in the best interest of the child, but also noted
that the child, then twelve-years old, on examination had shown a mind
of his own and to continue the present arrangement would deprive him
of his independent judgment in such matters. The modification was ap-
proved by the Court of Appeals of New York per curiam in a short
opinion which relied on the referee's conclusion that the change was best
for the child, who was deemed old enough to testify intelligently. In the
appellate division two justices had dissented from the memorandum
decision, insisting that during the formative years of a child's life he must
be guided in the religious and secular aspects of his education by his
parents, which period has not ended at the age of twelve. In the higher
court Judges Desmond and Conway dissented on the grounds that it
violated common sense and the laws of New York to make the choice of
a twelve-year old binding on the court, as they thought the majority had.
In addition such a rule was inconsistent with the parens patriae policy
of the state. The dissenters held that the agreement between the parties
was enforceable until it was shown to be harmful to the child. 265
The principle that the minority had condemned was taken to be the
ruling and applied in a later case. A mother who had custody of her
fifteen-year old daughter was instructing her in a Christian religion in
violation of her agreement to rear the child in the Jewish faith. The court
stated that the instruction might well have been deferred until the child
had arrived at an age of understanding, but the judge was bound by the
Martin case to recognize the right of a child to change her religion.2 66
The cursory treatment which the Martin case received from the major-
ity in both appellate courts gives little basis for the establishment of a
rule. What a full treatment of the problem by the Court of Appeals of
New York would reveal cannot be predicted. But if the dissenters were
correct, a rule has been established which seems to ignore the maturing
process to which all men are subject and the need during that transition
for guidance. New Jersey permits its trial judges to examine the desires
of children, but leaves the weight to be given to such wishes to the dis-
cretion of the trial court. A recent case ruled that the religious pre-
ferences of three children, aged seven, five, and three could not be
determinative of which faith they were to be reared in, a result in which
New York would probably concur.267 In an earlier New Jersey case a
higher court rejected the proposition that a child of twelve has sufficient
judgment to be permitted to conclusively determine his future, although
it was quite proper to consult him as to his wishes.2 68 The practice of
consultation in this form is realistic and obviously helpful to the trial
court in making its decision.
4) CUSTODY AND ADOPTION OF CIILDREN-Imposition of a Standard
The approach to the problems which religion raises in the determination
265 For a discussion opposing the dissent, see 43 CA. L. REv. 132 (1955).
266 Booke v. Booke, 207 Misc. 999, 141 N.Y.S.2d 580 (Sup. Ct. 1955). The wishes
of the children as to custody were consulted in Gluckstern v. Gluckstern, 148
N.Y.S.2d 391 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1955).
267 Wojnarowicz v. Wojnarowiez, 137 A.2d 618 (N.J. Super. 1958).
268 Callen v. Gill, 7 N.J. 312, 81 A.2d 495 (1951).
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of custody and adoption is generally identical in the states examined. 2 69
The trial judge is given discretion to determine what arrangement will be
in the best interest of the child. The power and independence of the
judge is indicated by a recent statement of the Supreme Court of Georgia
when considering an ante-nuptial agreement:
[P]arents cannot by contract relating to the religious training of their child-
ren restrict the discretion of the court in awarding custody, and the court
may disregard entirely any such contract.2 70
A party very interested in the manner in which this discretion is exercised
is the devout father or mother, concerned with the spiritual well-being of
his child. A recent Ohio decision speaking of such a person had this to
say:
Because of his unusual closeness to his church, the words of "The Pilot"
(Mar. 6, 1954), official organ of the Boston Archdiocese seems appropriate:
for Catholics their faith is their most treasured possession." And:
". small wonder they wish to see it passed on to the coming generation
as the road to their salvation as well."271
These are the forces present. They will be seen sometimes to clash, more
often adjust to one another.
Kansas recently considered the application of the best interest rule to
a most difficult situation with a result indicating there may be real
limitations to the effectiveness of the rule. 272 The case was on appeal
from a judgment removing children from the custody of their mother,
who claimed that the court's action was based on the fact that she was a
Jehovah's Witness and that the finding of her emotional instability made
by the trial court was a subterfuge. The trial court had examined the
children extensively on their religious beliefs and the children had given
answers in accord with the precepts of their mother's faith.2 73 But it
was declared in the opinion below that membership in a religion no matter
how obnoxious it might be to the judge, or the possibility that the child
will be instructed in the religion cannot qualify or disqualify a believer
from custody of the child. Since poor mental condition of the mother
was having an adverse effect on the children, they were taken from her.
This sensible ruling was upset as an abuse of discretion under the laws
of Kansas. In that state, courts have no authority over the religious train-
ing of children because of the paramount right of parents to educate
their children as they see fit. That right may not be violated by a con-
sideration of religious matters in determining custody. Therefore the
trial court erred when it permitted religion to permeate the whole pro-
ceeding, and if it had good reasons for changing the custody they could
not be separated from religious considerations. On the effect of church-
state separation the court cited the position of a Texas Court in con-
sidering a case somewhat similar to the present one:
269 In general see Huard, The Law of Adoption, Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND.
L. REv. 743 (1956); Pfeffer, Religion in the Upbringing of Children, 35 B.U.L. REV.
333 (1955).
270 Stanton v. Stanton, 100 S.E.2d 289, 293 (Ga. 1957).
271 Hackett v. Hackett, 146 N.E.2d 477, 482, (C.P. Ohio 1957).
272 Jackson v. Jackson, 181 Kan. 1, 309 P.2d 705 (1957).
273 The questions had to do with the nature of war and their willingness to serve
in the armed services. The oldest answered that he would determine for himself
when called upon, the younger two advanced stronger pacifistic beliefs. Jackson v.
Jackson, supra note 272 at 709-10.
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[T]he secular power is so shackled and restrained by -our fundamental
law that it is beyond the power of a court, in awarding the custody of the
child, to prefer, as tending to promote the interest of the child or surround
it with a more normal atmosphere, the religious views or teachings of either
parent.2
74
The remarks of the dissent seem well taken in declaring that the court has
a right and a duty to consider religious matters in instances where parent's
extreme religious views result in emotional instability in the parent.
The effect of the decision is a limitation of the trial court's ability to
search out the best interest of the child through a broad investigation of
all relevant materials; religion is not to be treated as any other pertinent
factor. An examination of the following cases will often show religion
being placed in a minor position, but never completely eliminated from
the basis for decision. What is said and done suggests that reality requires
more attention be paid to the question of religion in this area, and that
the Constitution does not prohibit such attention.
The problem of polygamous marriage in Utah provided the back-
ground in another extreme situation.2 75 The case involved the children of
a polygamous marriage whose parents had instructed them that polygamy
was the proper way of life and refused to do otherwise. The children were
removed from the custody of the parents, on the grounds that the teach-
ing was immoral, and that they were therefore "neglected children"
under a statute which defined such children as those whose parents had
failed to give them proper guidance necessary for their moral well-
being.270 It is difficult to criticise the decision due to the local aspects of
the problem. Perhaps, as a concurring opinion suggests, the question could
have been better resolved without labelling the practice of polygamy as
immoral. The same effect could have been reached by classifying poly-
gamy as a felony. The court has not found these people to be other than
devout, honest, and Godfearing, even though engaging in what the
majority labels immorality. To make martyrs of them would not only be
"casting the first stone" but making more difficult the ultimate solution of
the problem. 277
Two rather unusual cases indicated the willingness of some courts to
consider questions of religion in determining the best interest of a child.
The first involved a writ of habeas corpus directed to a mother who had
custody of the petitioner's children. The mother was living in adultery
with another man, but the children were given good care, although they
were not attending church. The petitioner was found to be a devout
Catholic and good citizen concerned with their spiritual welfare. In grant-
ing the writ, the court noted that if the mother were otherwise fit, and
if she had insisted on rearing the children in another faith there would
be no basis for removing them from her care. But the children in the
274 Salvagio v. Barnett, 248 S.W.2d 244, (Tex. Civ. App. 1952). But a different
result is reached. Here there was an actual finding that because of the religious
beIiefs of the party having custody, the best interest of the child was with someone
who would give her more normal surroundings. The action of the trial court was
not reversed because there was an independent ground on which to base it.
275 In re State in Interest of Black, 3 Utah 2d 315, 283 P.2d 887 (1955).
276 UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-30, 32 (1953).
277 In re State ih Interest of Black, supra note 275 at 914. It appears that the
judge himself traces his origin to a polygamous home.
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case were not receiving religious training in any denomination, a factor
which should be considered among other matters in awarding custody.278
A similar attitude was displayed in a California decision which declared
that there were no religious qualifications for the office of guardian, and
that in making a selection the best interest of the child is the primary
determinant. But a court should consider the religious affiliations of the
guardian and the wishes of the parents in placing a child.2 79
A recent Connecticut case illustrates the willingness which has been
noted in trial judges to decide cases expressly in reference to religious
matters. It involved a petition by an estranged husband for the custody
of his children. The findings included the fact that the children were re-
ceiving no religious instruction in their present home, and that they would
in the home where they were sought to be placed. The court concluded
that it was in the best interest of the children to place them with people
who would provide them with several advantages they were now lacking,
including, "the opportunity to continue their religious education in a
Catholic home." 280 On appeal the Supreme Court in reviewing the
decision simply held it to be clear that the trial judge had been guided
by the best interest rule and affirmed his order.
The last three cases indicate that where the religious element is evenly
balanced between two parties it will not be given extensive consideration.
But a home that will provide a religious atmosphere will be preferred to
one which lacks the same spiritual environment.
Several statutes have been enacted by the states which, to varying de-
grees, have attempted to limit the discretion of the trial court in the place-
ment of children for adoption. The Massachusetts statute28 is unusual
because it requires the court to place the child with foster parents of the
same faith when such placement is practicable.2 8 2 Other states recognize
a broader discretion in following the statutory provision that the religion
of the child and the foster parent are to be considered in placement. 283
The well-known case of Ellis v. McCoy 28 4 concerned the application of
the Massachusetts law to a situation in which a mother whose child had
been adopted petitioned the court for leave to withdraw her permission.
The reason given was that the child had been placed with persons who
were not of her faith, and the trial court granted the withdrawal. On
appeal the order was upheld as an exercise of discretion in which the
court is bound by the statute to act in favor of identity of religion.
New York, as does Massachusetts, requires by statute28 that the trial
judge must favor persons of the same religious faith as the parent. The
question of constitutionality of these laws has been raised in a Massachu-
setts case,28 6 but the United States Supreme Court refused certiorari,287
278 Schreifels v. Schreifels, 47 Wash. 2d 409, 287 P.2d 1001 (1955).
279 In re Minnicar's Estate, 141 Cal. App. 2d 603, 297 P.2d 105 (1956).
280 Murphy v. Murphy, 143 Conn. 600, 124 A.2d 891, 893 (1956).
281 MASS. ANN. LAws c. 210, § 5 B (1955).
282 Petition of Gaily, 329 Mass. 143, 107 N.E.2d 21 (1952).
283 Cooper v. Hinrichs, 10 Ill. 2d 269, 140 N.E.2d 293 (1957) (in which the court
reviews decisions from many states.)
284 332 Mass. 647, 124 N.E.2d 266 (1955).
285 N.Y. DOM. RELa. LAW § 113.
286 Petitions of Goldman, 331 Mass. 254, 121 N.E.2d 843 (1954).
287 Goldman v. Fogarty, 348 U.S. 942 (1955). See Note, 64 YALE L.J. 772 (1955).
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and left standing the decision in favor of validity. While noting these
constitutional developments, a New York court has applied the statute
in denying an application of a Catholic couple for the adoption of a Pro-
testant child.288
Though the statutes of other states have not been interpreted as placing
an absolute mandate on the court, a Maryland statute289 did seem to have
a definite effect on the outcome in a recent adoption case.290 A heavy
factor in the final determination was the advanced age of the prospective
foster parents, but the court in denying the adoption was compelled to
recognize and give effect to the fact that the couple was of a different
faith than the mother and that it was possible to place the child with
Catholics.
A Georgia court considering a custody problem in a divorce case,
held that under the Georgia statute,29 ' similar to the one in Maryland,
it could properly consider the religious atmosphere into which the children
were being placed. But the court insisted that the statute did not indicate
that the legislature had intended to restrict the discretion of the trial court
in the placement of children.2 92
The Illinois courts have given extensive treatment to the meaning and
effect of these statutes in the case of Cooper v. Hinrichs.293 The appellate
court approved a decision by the trial court denying the application for
adoption presented by a couple of different faith than the child, holding
that the Illinois statute2 94 had the same effect as that of Massachusetts.
The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed, holding that the Illinois law was
to be classified in the group of statutes which are merely advisory. One
of the reasons for this classification came from the wording of the statute
where it said that the court "shall" rather than "must" act in favor of
identity of religion as the Massachusetts act had required. The religious
factor, however, as a result of the statute is now more significant, for the
trial court is directed to give preference to those of the same religion
wherever they are otherwise fit to be adoptive parents. But the trial
court has the discretion to determine what will best serve the child, and
in that determination the identity of religion is "a significant and desirable
but not an exclusive factor to be considered by the court in the exercise of
this discretion." 295 Heed will be paid to religion, but not at the cost of
"best interest." The instant case was remanded for further consideration
of the petition, to determine whether the adoption would serve the best
interests of the child in light of the differences in religion.
The decision's effect, contrary to its face value, is to elminate the
religious preference provision from the statute, and leave the law exactly
where it was before the act. Any placement of a child with foster parents
288 Adoption of Anonymous, 207 Misc. 240, 137 N.Y.S.2d 720 (County Ct. 1955).
289 MD. ANN. CoDE art. 16, § 67 (1957).
290 Frantum v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 214 Md. 100, 133 A.2d 408 (1957). See
17 MD. L. REv. 353 (1957).
291 GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2423 (Supp. 1955).
292 Stanton v. Stanton, 100 S.E.2d 289 (Ga. 1957).
293 8 111. App. 2d 144, 130 N.E.2d 678 (1955); rev'd, 10 Ill. 2d 269, 140 N.E.2d
293 (1957). See Comment, 1957 ILL. L.F. 114.
294 ILL. REv. STAT. c. 4, § 4-2 (1955).
295 Cooper v. Hinrichs, 10 Iii. 2d 269, 140 N.E.2d 293, 297 (1957).
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of a different faith may be justified simply as being in the best interest
of the child. The legislature, as the court admits, intended a different
result. 296
The importance of an individual's religious life in domestic relations
cases has been examined. The cases on adoption and custody have re-
vealed that religious values are treated by judges in the placement of
children in the same manner that any other factor is handled, that is,
the weight given them is in direct proportion to the importance which the
judge, in his experience, thinks that they have to a child. A justice who
highly assays the value of a "Catholic home and instruction" can honestly
define the best interest of a Catholic child to include such an environment
and education. But one who feels that any Christian home will provide
that environment which he feels is necessary for a child's well-being, can
in all honesty place that same Catholic child in a non-Catholic home
where, under his system of values, the child's best interest will be served.
This is the nature of the discretion which, within the limitation that the
law cannot favor one religion over another, is necessarily given to the
trial judge.
If a particular group feels that within the intellectual makeup of the
men from which judges in their community are drawn, there will not
necessarily be found an appreciation of the value of religious training
similar to that which they possess, they should have recourse to the legis-
lature for the passage of a statute similar to that of Massachusetts. Despite
the rather favorable attitude of the Maryland court, statutes such as that
of Illinois in effect only reiterate the discretion of the court. The Supreme
Court of Georgia has said this plainly, Illinois indirectly but just as
effectively. In a given situation the statutory expression of the policy may
be persuasive to a judge, but in all honesty he may reach the same con-
clusion as he would without the statute. Yet an Illinois-type statute is
not without its place. It may be the best that is attainable. Furthermore,
it might be extended to include the awarding of custody following divorce.
There is not in that situation a number of fit persons from which a court
may chose as parents, but the legislative suggestion might prove useful
in having children placed with the parent of the faith in which the child
has been reared whenever otherwise proper.
One point should be reemphasized in conclusion. If it is necessary to
limit the discretion of the trial judge it is not because he has not honestly
sought out the best interest of the child, but because his honest effort
does not always produce a result which a certain group has reason to
believe is correct. In a democratic society it is fitting that there be an
opportunity to limit the judiciary in a matter such as this where men may
differ on the solution of a practical problem. But any such action ought
to be undertaken only after a careful consideration of the work presently
being done by the judges, and with a conviction that the policy to be
enforced is of higher value than courts which can act in accord with
their own wisdom. William D. Bailey, Jr.
Richard C. Clark
Patrick F. McCartan, Jr.
296 The dissent stated that the court cannot "depreciate the high priority that the
legislature clearly intended [religious belief] to have." 140 N.E.2d at 298. Where
there were qualified families of the same faith available, the trial court was clearly
within its discetion in doing what it did. Cooper v. Henrichs, supra note 295.
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